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A Comparative Analysis of the 
NFL’s Disciplinary Structure: 
The Commissioner’s Power and 
Players’ Rights 
Cole Renicker* 
 
The power of professional sports commissioners to determine what is 
in the “best interests” of their respective sport is a significant aspect of 
sports today, and can be traced back to 1921, when the federal courts 
authorized then-Commissioner Kenesaw Mountain Landis to act with a 
broad range of discretion in protecting the “best interests” of baseball. 
This precedent set in motion a long history of commissioners using the 
“best interests” of the game power to accomplish various goals, and most 
recently has been used to discipline players for alleged misconduct. The 
Commissioner of the National Football League, Roger Goodell, has re-
cently been criticized both for using this power to impose initial discip-
line, and also for using his power under Article XLVI of the NFL’s Col-
lective Bargaining Agreement to oversee appeals for punishment that he 
personally issues. This Note explores the power allotted to the NFL’s 
Commissioner under the League’s Constitution and Bylaws, the current 
Collective Bargaining Agreement, and the NFL’s Personal Conduct 
Policy. It also examines the NFL Commissioner’s power in hearing an 
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appeal made by a player for any punishment that is imposed on him. In 
order to fully understand the power conferred on the NFL’s Commis-
sioner, this Note compares the power of the NFL’s Commissioner to the 
powers of the Commissioners of Major League Baseball and the Nation-
al Basketball Association. Additionally, this Note discusses the discipli-
nary power afforded to commissioners in non-sports settings, such as the 
New York City Police Department and management at Ford Motor 
Company, relative to the NFL Commissioner’s disciplinary power. Ul-
timately, this Note proposes that the NFL Commissioner retains his cur-
rent power to impose initial discipline, albeit with additional due process 
rights provided to the players, such as an opportunity to be heard. It then 
proposes to reconfigure the players’ appeal rights, providing the players 
with an impartial, three-panel arbitration, which is agreed upon by both 
the NFL Management Council and the NFL Players’ Association. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In any sort of labor context, where there is a hierarchy of em-
ployment characterized by varying levels of management and sub-
ordinate employees, the power to discipline is a bedrock principle 
that is crucial to maintaining order in the workplace.1 This power, 
typically belonging to management, may take various forms and is 
justified in varying circumstances.2 Much like other labor situa-
tions, the relationship in the National Football League (“NFL” or 
“the League”) between the owners (“Management”) and the 
Players’ Union is also impacted by the League’s power to discip-
line players who do not represent the League adequately.3 
Given the popularity of sports and the instantaneousness of 
media coverage today, athletes live in an environment where they 
must be mindful of their actions at all times.4 With up-to-the-
minute technology and cameras essentially everywhere, athletes 
are front and center in many American homes.5 Despite warnings 
against the idolization of athletes,6 people continue to view athletes 
as role models, due to both the nature of their profession and their 
vast exposure to the public.7 
The concept of athletes as role models has paved the way for 
leagues and their respective governing bodies to impose discipline 
when athletes’ actions do not conform to the “best interests” of 
their league.8 It is no secret that professional sports leagues are 
                                                                                                                            
1 See Employee Discipline, 16 ANDREWS EMP. LITIG. REP., no. 6, 2001, at 12. 
2 See id. 
3 See infra Section I.C. 
4 See Sean Bukowski, Flag on the Play: 25 to Life for the Offense of Murder, 3 VAND. J. 
ENT. L. & PRAC. 106, 108 (2001) (noting that athletes are high-profile public figures, thus 
every aspect of their lives draws media attention). 
5 See id. 
6 Michael Rose-Ivey, Athletes as Role Models? An Athlete Gives His Take, KNOW IT ALL 
FOOTBALL (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.knowitallfootball.com/2014/02/28/athletes-
role-models-athlete/ [https://perma.cc/DX3N-R8MS]. 
7 See Bukowski, supra note 4, at 108. For example, NFL games accounted for forty-
five of the top fifty watched-programs during the course of its 2014–2015 season. Sarah 
Bibel, NFL 2014 TV Recap: 202 Million Viewers, Game Viewership Nearly Triples Broadcast 
Primetime, ZAP2IT: TV BY THE NUMBERS (Jan. 9, 2015), http://tvbythenumbers.zap2it
.com/2015/01/09/nfl-2014-tv-recap-202-million-viewers-game-viewership-nearly-
triples-broadcast-primetime/348433/ [https://perma.cc/9XYC-57TJ]. 
8 Major League Baseball Collective Bargaining Agreement Art. XII.B (2012) 
[hereinafter 2012 MLB CBA]; see generally Jason M. Pollack, Take My Arbitrator, Please: 
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money-driven industries.9 Thus, when the leagues’ governing bo-
dies feel that their sport—and therefore, their product—is being 
devalued due to the poor conduct of their athletes, the governing 
bodies take action to curtail the bad behavior.10 Commissioners 
take punitive action against athletes primarily through either sus-
pensions or fines, though outright banishments have also been 
handed out in particularly admonishing circumstances.11 As a re-
sult, the athletes of today must be cognizant not only of their con-
duct on the field, but also of the people they surround themselves 
with, where they go, and what they do away from the stadium or 
arena.12 
The threat of suspensions or fines has created an adversarial re-
lationship between the players and the governing bodies in sports 
leagues such as the NFL, Major League Baseball (“MLB”), and 
National Basketball Association (“NBA”).13 For the NFL, this sit-
uation has landed at the doorstep of its Commissioner, Roger Goo-
dell.14 During the NFL’s 2015 season, fifty-nine players were sus-
pended solely for their off-the-field conduct.15 Notably, that num-
ber is considerably higher than the number of players suspended 
                                                                                                                            
Commissioner “Best Interests” Disciplinary Authority in Professional Sports, 67 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1645 (1999). 
9 See Robert Ambrose, The NFL Makes It Rain: Through Strict Enforcement of Its 
Conduct Policy, the NFL Protects its Integrity, Wealth, and Popularity, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1069, 1106–07 (2008); see also Tom Van Riper, Thanks to Media, Sports Industry 
Growth Set to Accelerate, FORBES: SPORTSMONEY (Nov. 13, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomvanriper/2013/11/13/thanks-to-mediasports-industry-
growth-set-to-accelerate/ [https://perma.cc/N8UR-4YZF]. 
10 See, e.g., NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement Art. 46 § 1(a) (2011) [hereinafter 
2011 NFL CBA]. 
11 See, e.g., John Belaska, 10 Athletes Who Were Banned from Their Sports for Life, 
RICHEST (May 25, 2014), http://www.therichest.com/sports/10-athletes-who-were-
banned-from-their-sport-for-life/ [https://perma.cc/29BG-758U]. 
12 See Symposium, From the Arena to the Streets—The Pressures Placed on Athletes, 
Entertainers, and Management, 19 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 381, 480–82 (2009). 
13 See, e.g., Tom Pelissero, NFLPA Boss DeMaurice Smith Says Roger Goodell Forcing 
Union to Use Courts, USA TODAY (Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
sports/nfl/2015/09/04/smith-goodell-nflpa-brady-deflategate/71705650/ 
[https://perma.cc/EY6B-QN4H]. 
14 See id. 
15 2015 NFL Fines & Suspensions, SPOTRAC, http://www.spotrac.com/nfl/fines-
suspensions/2015/suspensions/ [https://perma.cc/6ZQH-Y4LG] (last visited Feb. 26, 
2016). 
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solely for their off-the-field conduct in the years prior to 2011.16 A 
possible reason for the increase in player discipline is the NFL’s 
current Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”), which took 
effect in 2011.17 
The current situation in the NFL is a peculiar one, because al-
though the power to discipline exists in almost any workplace, the 
means by which punishment is imposed on NFL players, and the 
due process rights provided to players when they are punished, are 
not necessarily similar to the way punishment is handled in other 
labor contexts.18 The NFL has a few key documents, which provide 
the Commissioner the power to discipline players, and they are ap-
plicable in specific situations. These documents are the League’s 
Constitution and Bylaws,19 the CBA,20 the Personal Conduct Poli-
cy,21 and the Substance Abuse Policy.22 Because the Substance 
Abuse Policy is mutually agreed upon by both parties and is not in 
dispute (in terms of its legality or enforceability),23 it will not be of 
focus in this Note. Notably, the other documents provide the 
Commissioner the authority to discipline players not only for their 
on-field—or work-site—behavior, but also provide the Commis-
sioner the authority to discipline players for their off-field beha-
vior.24 
                                                                                                                            
16 Compare id. (stating that fifty-nine players were suspended for off-field conduct), 
with 2010 NFL Fines & Suspensions, SPOTRAC, http://www.spotrac.com/nfl/fines-
suspensions/2010/suspensions [https://perma.cc/9LDG-LRLW] (last visited Feb. 26, 
2016) (stating that twenty-seven players were suspended in 2010 for off-field conduct), 
and 2008 NFL Fines & Suspensions, SPOTRAC, http://www.spotrac.com/nfl/fines-
suspensions/2008/suspensions [https://perma.cc/B5S6-836P] (last visited Feb. 26, 
2016) (stating that eleven players were suspended in 2008). 
17 See generally 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10. 
18 See infra Sections I.C–D. 
19 Constitution and Bylaws of the National Football League (1970, revised 2006) 
[hereinafter NFL Constitution]. 
20 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10. 
21 National Football League Personal Conduct Policy (2014) [hereinafter 2014 PCP]. 
22 National Football League: Policy and Program of Substance Abuse (2014) 
[hereinafter 2014 SAP]. 
23 See id.; see also Gregg Rosenthal, NFLPA Approves New Drug Policy; HGH Testing 
Included, NFL.com (Sept. 16, 2014) http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap30000003935
62/article/nflpa-approves-new-drug-policy-hgh-testing-included/ 
[https://perma.cc/WU9M-63GG] 
24 See, e.g., 2014 PCP, supra note 21 (authorizing the Commissioner to punish players 
for domestic violence, among other violent off-the-field crimes). 
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Recently, in 2014, former Baltimore Ravens Pro-Bowl running 
back Ray Rice was suspended by Commissioner Goodell, due to 
Rice’s involvement in a domestic violence altercation with his 
then-fiancé.25 In suspending Rice, Commissioner Goodell was act-
ing pursuant to the authority granted to him under the NFL’s 2013 
Personal Conduct Policy.26 After video of the altercation surfaced, 
the NFL changed his original two-game suspension into an indefi-
nite suspension.27 However, the increased suspension was over-
turned by an independent arbitrator, who stated that Commission-
er Goodell “abuse[d] his discretion” in extending Rice’s punish-
ment based solely on a viewing of the incident.28 
Two more cases involving suspensions arising under the 2014 
version of the NFL’s Personal Conduct Policy, which is slightly 
different than the 2013 version,29 involved All-Pro running back 
Adrian Peterson30 and perennial Pro-Bowler Greg Hardy.31 Peter-
son’s suspension came on the heels of a legal matter in which Pe-
terson reached a plea-bargain for misdemeanor reckless assault for 
                                                                                                                            
25 Ken Belson, Ravens’ Rice Draws 2-Game Suspension from Goodell, N.Y. TIMES (July 
24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/25/sports/football/ray-rice-draws-2-game
-suspension-from-nfl.html [https://perma.cc/EL4B-U79N]. 
26 See id. 
27 Ken Belson, A Punch Is Seen, and a Player Is Out, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/09/sports/football/ray-rice-video-shows-punch-and-
raises-new-questions-for-nfl.html [https://perma.cc/9UU3-EEJR]. 
28 Larry McShane & Gary Myers, Ray Rice Wins Appeal to Overturn NFL Suspension, 
Roger Goodell Blasted for Mishandling Case, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 29, 2014), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/ray-rice-eligible-play-nfl-suspension-
overturned-article-1.2027036 [https://perma.cc/H9HN-YD7B]. 
29 In the 2014 version of the Personal Conduct Policy, there is a specified six game 
suspension for a first-time violation of any of the listed forms of conduct, and a lifetime 
suspension for a second violation of that same conduct. Additionally, the Commissioner, 
or a player’s team, is permitted to place a player on the Commissioner’s Exempt List—
paid leave—while an investigation against that player is ongoing. Compare 2014 PCP, 
supra note 21, with National Football League Personal Conduct Policy (2013) [hereinafter 
2013 PCP]. 
30 Ryan Wilson, What You Should Know About Adrian Peterson’s Suspension, NFL 
Future, CBS SPORTS (Dec. 13, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/eye-on-
football/24884058/what-you-should-know-about-adrian-petersons-suspension-nfl-future 
[https://perma.cc/K7V3-NBC2]. 
31 Dan Hanzus, Greg Hardy Suspended 10 Games Without Pay, NFL.COM (Apr. 22, 
2015), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000487503/article/greg-hardy-suspend
ed-10-games-without-pay [https://perma.cc/5US8-9CQF]. 
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the lashing of his four-year old son.32 The Minnesota Vikings, Pe-
terson’s team, initially placed Peterson on the “Commissioner’s 
Exempt List,” a feature of the League’s 2014 Personal Conduct 
Policy, which is a suspension with pay while his legal dispute was 
ongoing.33 After Peterson reached a plea deal in the case, the NFL 
suspended him, without pay, for the remainder of the 2014 sea-
son.34 In suspending Peterson, the Commissioner was acting pur-
suant to his authority under the NFL’s 2014 Personal Conduct Pol-
icy.35 Relevant to Peterson’s suspension was the fact that pictures 
of the victim surfaced, depicting the horrific results of his actions, 
and these pictures certainly factored in the resulting suspensions.36 
Greg Hardy is alleged to have choked his girlfriend, thrown her 
on a futon covered in guns, and threatened her life.37 Hardy was 
convicted of misdemeanor assault following a bench trial.38 Under 
North Carolina state law, though, someone convicted of a misde-
meanor following a bench trial has the right to appeal the convic-
tion to a jury in the state’s superior court.39 On appeal for a jury 
trial, Hardy’s case was dismissed after the victim did not show up 
                                                                                                                            
32 See Peter King, Peterson’s Punishment, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 18, 2014), 
http://mmqb.si.com/2014/11/18/adrian-peterson-suspension-appeal-roger-goodell 
[https://perma.cc/K9YH-5V7J]. 
33 Adrian Peterson Timeline, NFL.COM (Apr. 16, 2015, 9:08 PM), http://www.nfl.com/
news/story/0ap3000000485782/article/adrian-peterson-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/7G
AD-NKH7]. 
34 See id. 
35 See Wilson, supra note 30; see also Adrian Peterson Suspended Without Pay for 
Remainder of 2014 NFL Season, CBSNEWS (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/adrian-peterson-suspended-without-pay-for-remainder-of-2014-season 
[https://perma.cc/2MHL-LEXE]. 
36 See Ian O’Connor, Visuals Sealed Adrian Peterson’s Fate, ESPN (Nov. 18, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/11897549/minnesota-vikings-rb-adrian-peterson-
was-done-horrific-visuals-child-abuse-case [https://perma.cc/4TFE-8HWV]. 
37 See Greg Hardy Case Dismissed After “Paid-Off” Accuser Disappears, N.Y. POST (Feb. 
9, 2015, 11:08 AM), http://nypost.com/2015/02/09/greg-hardy-case-dismissed-after-
paid-off-accuser-disappears/ [https://perma.cc/7DLU-AZH5]. 
38 See Michael Gordon et al., Panthers Greg Hardy Guilty of Assaulting Female, 
Communicating Threats, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (July 15, 2014), 
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/article9140591.html 
[https://perma.cc/VG4Y-EL93]; see also Panthers’ Greg Hardy Guilty on 2 Counts of 
Domestic Violence, USA TODAY (July 15, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
sports/nfl/2014/07/15/hardy-guilty-on-2-counts-of-domestic-violence/12714103/ 
[https://perma.cc/4ZAS-HKJ5]. 
39 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1431(b) (2015). 
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to testify.40 The assault charge was based upon the testimony of the 
victim, and without the victim’s cooperation, the case did not have 
enough evidence to continue.41 Allegedly, an undisclosed monetary 
settlement between Hardy and the victim caused the victim to stop 
cooperating with the prosecution.42 After the case was dismissed, 
Hardy was suspended for ten games by the NFL.43 Hardy appealed 
his suspension to an independent arbitrator, in accordance with the 
NFL’s CBA, and the suspension was reduced to four games.44 
Additionally, suspensions may be imposed on players for their 
on-field conduct.45 In 2015, the NFL suspended Tom Brady, the 
two-time MVP of the New England Patriots, for his alleged in-
volvement with the under-inflation of footballs, in contravention 
with the NFL’s Game Manual.46 Brady was initially suspended by 
Commissioner Goodell for four games, and the Commissioner then 
upheld the suspension through his authority under Article XLVI47 
in the NFL’s CBA.48 In what has become known as “Deflate-
gate,”49 the NFL and Brady have clashed for over a year starting in 
January 2015, following a playoff game, when a number of the Pa-
                                                                                                                            
40 Panthers’ Greg Hardy Guilty on 2 Counts of Domestic Violence, supra note 38. 
41 See Glenn Counts & Bora Kim, Judge Dismisses Case Against Greg Hardy, NBC 
CHARLOTTE (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.wcnc.com/story/news/crime/2015/02/06/
jury-selection-be-complicated-in-greg-hardy-trial/23008195/ [https://perma.cc/63XY-
4FM8]. 
42 See Panthers’ Greg Hardy Guilty on 2 Counts of Domestic Violence, supra note 38. 
43 Hanzus, supra note 31. 
44 Dan Hanzus, Greg Hardy Suspension Reduced to Four Games, NFL.COM (July 10, 
2015), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000500985/article/greg-hardy-suspen
sion-reduced-to-four-games [https://perma.cc/T3UY-EUTT]. 
45 See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at app. A (stating that the Uniform Player 
Contract requires players to abide by an “Integrity of the Game” clause, which may 
subject players to punishment for violating that clause); see also infra note 131. 
46 Timeline of Events for Deflategate, Tom Brady, ESPN (Sept. 3, 2015), 
http://espn.go.com/blog/new-england-patriots/post/_/id/4782561/timeline-of-events-
for-deflategate-tom-brady [https://perma.cc/F8A8-ZCMB]. 
47 Article 46 of the CBA, negotiated between the Players and the Owners, is the section 
that grants the Commissioner the power to discipline players for partaking in “conduct 
detrimental to the League.” See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 1(a). 
48 See id.; see also Ken Belson, Judge Erases Tom Brady’s Suspension; N.F.L. Says It Will 
Appeal, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/sports/
football/tom-brady-suspension-deflategate.html [https://perma.cc/EL9B-T3AB]; Troy 
Vincent’s Letter to Tom Brady, ESPN (May 12, 2015), http://espn.go.com/nfl/
story/_/id/12873455/troy-vincent-letter-tom-brady [https://perma.cc/9BHB-NBJN]. 
49 See Timeline of Events for Deflategate, Tom Brady, supra note 46. 
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triots’ footballs were removed at halftime for having air pressure 
below the requirement.50 Upon Brady’s appeal to federal district 
court, Judge Berman of the Southern District of New York over-
turned the suspension.51 Brady argued, and the Judge agreed, that 
Brady did not have notice of the potential four-game suspension for 
the accused conduct, nor did he have access to key witnesses and 
to the original report which was the basis for the suspension.52 Fol-
lowing the NFL’s appeal, however, the Second Circuit overturned 
Judge Berman’s decision, and reinstated Brady’s four-game sus-
pension.53 The Second Circuit determined that Commissioner 
Goodell did not abuse his discretion, and acted within his power 
under the CBA.54 The case has been remanded to the District 
Court, with instructions to uphold Goodell’s decision to suspend 
Brady.55 Brady can file a petition for an en banc review, where the 
entire panel of Second Circuit judges will rehear the case—as op-
posed to the initial three-judge panel—or Brady can file a petition 
for the case to be heard by the U.S. Supreme Court.56 Though a 
review of either kind is pretty rare, Brady appears to be gearing up 
for another appeal.57 
All of the punishment issued to these players invites several 
important questions. How is discipline decided, and who is the one 
to decide it? How does the Commissioner’s power and discretion 
                                                                                                                            
50 See id. 
51 Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, Nos. 
15 Civ. 5916, 15 Civ. 5982 (RMB) (JCF), 2015 WL 5148739, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 
2015). 
52 See id. at *11, *16–20. 
53 See Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 
No. 15-2801, 2016 WL 1619883, at *17 (2d Cir. 2016). 
54 See id. at *12–17. 
55 See id. at *17. 
56 See Michael McCann, Tom Brady Faces Long Odds After NFL Wins Deflategate 
Appeal, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.si.com/nfl/2016/04/25/tom-
brady-deflategate-suspension-nfl-appeal-roger-goodell [https://perma.cc/W33F-
RKMQ]. 
57 See id. (stating that less than one percent of Second Circuit en banc petitions are 
granted, and roughly one percent of Supreme Court petitions are granted); see also Dan 
Graf, Tom Brady Appears to Be Getting Ready for Another Deflategate Appeal, FOX SPORTS 
(Apr. 29, 2016), http://www.foxsports.com/nfl/story/tom-brady-new-england-patriots-
deflategate-suspension-appeal-042916 [https://perma.cc/8UZ8-24TJ]. 
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in imposing discipline on players compare to other sports or indus-
tries? How does the due process afforded to the players compare to 
other sports or industries? What kind of rights do the players have 
in challenging their punishment? 
Part I of this Note first discusses due process rights provided to 
the general population, and then discusses how due process rights 
apply in the workplace, specifically in employee discipline. Part I 
then analyzes the NFL Commissioner’s power to discipline play-
ers, and the players’ due process rights throughout the NFL’s dis-
ciplinary process. Additionally, Part I looks at the players’ rights to 
appeal disciplinary decisions, and the NFL Commissioner’s power 
to review disciplinary decisions under the CBA and Personal Con-
duct Policy. Part I finishes by comparing the NFL players’ due 
process and appeal rights to players in the MLB and the NBA, as 
well as to union employees working for Ford Motor Company, and 
for the New York City Police Department. Part II addresses the 
main conflict presented in this Note, which concerns the adequacy 
of the due process rights provided to NFL players in their discip-
line as compared to the rights of employees in other labor contexts. 
Part III proposes a new structure for the NFL’s disciplinary 
process, drawing from various concepts and theories utilized by the 
NBA, MLB, Ford, and the NYPD. This Note concludes with an 
analysis of the pros and cons of the proposed solution. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Due Process 
1. Generally 
Due process is a fundamental protection, not only to the 
workplace, but to the country—and its people—as a whole. It is 
such a fundamental concept, it is enumerated in two separate 
amendments in the Constitution: the Fifth, which prohibits the 
federal government from infringing on due process,58 and the Four-
teenth, which prohibits the state government from infringing on 
due process.59 Though due process is a very complicated concept, 
                                                                                                                            
58 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
59 Id. at amend. XIV, § 1. 
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what it entails is an individual’s right to fairness, both substantively 
and procedurally. 
The concept of due process is a two-step examination, consist-
ing of both a substantive due process determination, and a proce-
dural due process determination.60 Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, states are prohibited from depriving “any person of life, li-
berty, or property, without due process of law.”61 Courts have in-
terpreted this provision to grant substantive due process rights, 
protecting the people in three aspects. First, substantive due 
process protects rights explicitly enumerated in the Constitution’s 
Bill of Rights;62 second, substantive due process protects the rights 
that may not be explicitly listed, but have been deemed fundamen-
tal nonetheless;63 and third, substantive due process protects citi-
zens against arbitrary abuses of government power, even where 
there is no enumerated or fundamental right being implicated.64 
Procedural due process guarantees that when someone’s subs-
tantive due process rights are being infringed, he or she must be 
                                                                                                                            
60 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (stating that the court must 
determine whether there is a protected liberty or property interest and, if so, what 
procedures are required). 
61 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
62 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding that a broad 
D.C.-wide ban on handguns violated the Second Amendment infringing on substantive 
due process). 
63 The right to privacy has been viewed as a fundamental right, though ruling certain 
interests to be fundamental has come with significant backlash: 
Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for this 
Court. There are risks when the judicial branch gives enhanced 
protection to certain substantive liberties without the guidance of the 
more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. As the history of the 
Lochner era demonstrates, there is reason for concern lest the only 
limits to such judicial intervention become the predilections of those 
who happen at the time to be Members of this Court. That history 
counsels caution and restraint. But it does not counsel abandonment, 
nor does it require what the city urges here: cutting off any protection 
of family rights at the first convenient, if arbitrary boundary the 
boundary of the nuclear family. 
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977). 
64 See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398 (1937) (ruling that the 
government action must not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious and that the means 
selected have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained). 
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provided sufficient procedures as a remedy.65 Determining the suf-
ficiency of particular procedures requires taking a look at three 
separate factors. First, the private interest being affected; second, 
the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest through the proce-
dures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and third, the government’s interest, 
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 
burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirements 
would entail.66 After looking at those three factors, a determination 
is typically made on whether or not the procedures provided are 
sufficient to the harmed party.67 
Due process, in general, is an incredibly complex topic. In the 
context of this Note, what is most important in the analysis of NFL 
player discipline is the ways in which due process affects the 
workplace and the due process rights that are typically provided to 
employees. 
2. Due Process Within Labor 
Applying the principles of due process to the workplace can be 
tricky when considering that the due process rights provided in the 
Constitution are geared to protect people from government interfe-
rence, not interference from a private party, such as an employer.68 
Regardless, due process rights are always provided to public em-
ployees, and are provided to private employees when there is a 
contractual agreement providing such rights. The rights provided 
are typically consistent with those protected by the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments.69 Additionally, courts have extended certain 
common-law due process rights typically reserved for public em-
                                                                                                                            
65 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332–33. 
66 Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224–25 (2005). 
67 See id. 
68 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; id. at amend. V. 
69 See JOHN E. SANCHEZ & ROBERT D. KLAUSNER, STATE & LOCAL EMPLOYMENT 
LIABILITY §§ 14:20, 14:23 (Dec. 2015). Although private employers are not required to 
provide employees with the same due process rights that public employers are required to 
provide, they typically do provide them in collective bargaining agreements after the 
Union bargained for them, or as a policy decision to foster Employee-Employer peace. See 
Pietro Lynn, Pretermination Hearing Is Not Always Necessary, 2 VT. EMP. L. LETTER, no. 
10, 1997, at 1. 
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ployment70 to private contractual relationships,71 namely, notice of 
the pending discipline and a fair hearing before an impartial tribun-
al.72 Courts will extend due process rights into the contractual rela-
tionship in an employment setting in two main instances: when an 
employee’s economic interests are impacted, or when there is a 
wrongful termination claim at stake.73 Courts are reluctant to ex-
tend due process rights into the employment relationships though, 
as they typically do not want to interfere with the contracts that 
private parties enter into.74 
In the private labor context, businesses employ either a non-
unionized or a unionized workforce.75 In a non-unionized work-
force, employment is usually based on individual contracts signed 
by employees and is typically “at-will” employment.76 “At-will” 
employment simply means that the employee may be fired at any 
time or the employee may quit at any time.77 Since the NFL is a 
unionized workforce though,78 this Section focuses on the proce-
dural due process rights provided to unionized employees. 
When represented by a union, the employees and employer 
typically will negotiate a CBA, which dictates various terms of em-
ployment.79 One of the terms that is typically addressed in a CBA is 
                                                                                                                            
70 Public employment is best categorized as being employed by the government, as 
opposed to a private organization. Public Employee Law and Legal Definition, U.S. LEGAL, 
http://definitions.uslegal.com/p/public-employee/ [https://perma.cc/WF5P-3YVD] 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2016). 
71 See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 590 
(2000). 
72 See id. 
73 See id. at 589; Ambrosino v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 899 F. Supp. 438, 445–47 
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (termination of membership based solely on physician’s previous drug 
addiction was arbitrary and capricious, and violated plaintiff’s common law right to fair 
procedures). 
74 See infra notes 124–29. 
75 See The Union Difference, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/Learn-About-
Unions/What-Unions-Do/The-Union-Difference [https://perma.cc/WBN3-6EP3] (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2016). 
76 See J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment 
Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 837, 838 (1995); see also Gary 
S. Fealk, At-Will Employment vs. Just Cause Employment, 25 MICH. EMP. L. LETTER,  no. 2, 
2014, at 3. 
77 See Verkerke, supra note 76, at 838. 
78 See generally 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10. 
79 See Verkerke, supra note 76, at 864–65. 
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how employees are to be disciplined.80 Discipline may be further 
elaborated in supportive materials, like an employee handbook, 
which may further specify certain behavior that will be disciplined, 
and the severity of discipline that may be issued based on the em-
ployee’s conduct.81 
Typically, discipline is handled in unionized workforces under 
a “just cause” standard, which means that an employee will only 
be disciplined for conduct that constitutes “cause.”82 How 
“cause” is determined is usually a subjective determination made 
by the disciplinary officer, but may be further specified by materials 
such as an employee handbook, as discussed above.83 Having a 
“just cause” standard is a crucial right provided to employees, be-
cause it safeguards them from being disciplined arbitrarily.84 When 
being disciplined for “cause,” employees must also be afforded 
procedural due process rights leading up to the disciplinary deci-
sion.85 
When determining the due process rights provided to em-
ployees, there are typically two different aspects that a CBA sets 
out: adequate notice of conduct that is subject to discipline, and a 
fair hearing for the employee to oppose the pending discipline.86 
Adequate notice is a fundamental due process right in employee 
discipline, because employees need to know what conduct is going 
to be punished, and how it will be punished.87 Additionally, the 
employees need to know whether or not certain conduct has been 
punished in the past, and if they are currently facing any sort of 
discipline for their conduct.88 
A fair hearing is also an important procedural due process right 
provided to employees because being able to explain the situation 
before the disciplining body can be the difference between being 
                                                                                                                            
80 See id. 
81 See id. at 889–90. 
82 See Fealk, supra note 76. 
83 See generally Verkerke, supra note 76, at 889–90. 
84 Id. at 838. 
85 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985). 
86 See id. at 542–45. 
87 See id. at 546. 
88 See generally id. 
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disciplined or not.89 Additionally, by being able to present evi-
dence, or to at least elaborate on exactly what happened, the em-
ployee may be able to mitigate the discipline, and have it reduced, if 
not completely erased.90 
These are two of the more common procedural due process 
rights afforded to employees and are two of the more basic rights 
that employees are typically provided. Since there are other due 
process rights provided to employees,91 it is important to look at 
how player and employee discipline has been handled in the past, 
and the rights that are currently provided to players in the NFL, 
MLB, and NBA, as well as employees in companies like Ford and 
organizations like the NYPD. 
B. History of Power Granted to Sports Commissioners 
The history of the power granted to sports commissioners is a 
long one, and one that is not tailored specifically to disciplining 
players. Though player discipline is something that all sports 
commissioners are empowered to handle, the power to do so first 
began in the MLB, and fell under the broad power of the Commis-
sioner to take action in the “best interests” of the League.92 The 
“best interests” power was created and implemented in 1921 by 
the first Commissioner of MLB, Kenesaw Mountain Landis.93 Af-
ter the 1919 “Black Sox” scandal, in which members of the White 
Sox baseball team had been found to have intentionally thrown a 
World Series championship,94 Landis was appointed as the Com-
missioner of MLB. However, Landis was reluctant to take the job, 
and only accepted on the condition that he was provided broad dis-
                                                                                                                            
89 See id. at 542–43. 
90 See id. at 543–44. 
91 See infra Sections I.D.1–4. 
92 See Matthew L. Winkel, The Not-So-Artful Dodger: The McCourt-Selig Battle and the 
Powers of the Commissioner of Baseball, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 539, 540–44 (2013). 
93 See id. at 542–44; see also Jonathan M., Reinsdorf, The Powers of the Commissioner in 
Baseball, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 211, 220–22 (1996); Kenesaw Mountain Landis Bio Page, 
BASEBALL HALL OF FAME, http://baseballhall.org/hof/landis-kenesaw [https://perma.cc/
554R-G7HL] (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). 
94 See Reinsdorf, supra note 93, at 219–20. 
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ciplinary power to protect the “best interests of the game.”95 Since 
that initial language was implemented, commissioners in other 
sports have utilized the clause during their tenure.96 As former 
MLB Commissioner Bud Selig stated, “[T]he intent of the best 
interest clause was to protect the integrity of and ensure public 
confidence in the game.”97 
In Milwaukee American Association v. Landis, the court had to 
decide if a Major League team owner, who also owned Minor 
League teams, could transfer a player back and forth between his 
Major League team and Minor League teams using outright sales 
agreements.98 By doing so, and failing to disclose these agreements 
to other Major League teams, the owner was able to get around the 
waiver process, whereby a different owner could “claim” the play-
er for his team.99 When the owner sought the Commissioner’s ap-
proval for a contract with the player, the Commissioner refused to 
grant it.100 The team challenged the Commissioner’s power to de-
ny approval for the contract, and the court sided with the Commis-
sioner.101 The court reasoned, “[T]he commissioner is empowered 
to investigate upon his own initiative any act . . . charged or alleged 
to be detrimental to the best interests of baseball, to determine 
what . . . action is appropriate . . . and to take such action against 
leagues or clubs as the case may require.”102 In its reasoning, the 
court ultimately held that the Commissioner was acting within his 
discretionary power in disapproving the player’s contract.103 
In 1965, spearheaded by Marvin Miller, a pivotal figure in play-
ers’ union history, the first real agreement in the MLB was formed 
                                                                                                                            
95 Bukowski, supra note 4, at 109–10 (2001); see also Colin J. Daniels & Aaron Brooks, 
From the Black Sox to the Sky Box: The Evolution and Mechanics of Commissioner Authority, 
10 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 23, 26 (2008). 
96 See, e.g., 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 (prohibiting conduct 
“detrimental” to the game, thus protecting its best interests). 
97 Matthew A. Foote, Three Strikes and You’re (Not Necessarily) Out: How Baseball’s 
Erratic Approach to Conduct Violations Is Not in the Best Interest of the Game, 6 DEPAUL 
SPORT L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 6 (2009). 
98 See Milwaukee Am. Ass’n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 300–01 (N.D. Ill. 1931). 
99 See id. at 302. 
100 See id. at 299–301. 
101 See id. at 304. 
102 Id. at 302. 
103 See id. at 304. 
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between the players’ union and the team owners.104 Although it 
initially only covered pensions and insurance, two years later Miller 
negotiated a full labor agreement, including a formal grievance pro-
cedure.105 Building off of the first agreement, Miller was able to ar-
gue that the Commissioner was not an “impartial arbitrator” to 
decide grievances, and successfully negotiated to have players’ 
grievances that did not involve violations of the “integrity of the 
game” clause to be heard by third party arbitrators in the next 
CBA.106 Though this was the first instance of arbitration heard by 
an impartial third party, the Commissioner’s “best interests” 
power was still in full effect.107 
Finley v. Kuhn followed a similar factual narrative as Landis, 
where then-Commissioner Bowie Kuhn rejected an attempt by one 
Major League team to sell three of its players to other Major 
League teams.108 Kuhn determined that the attempted maneuver 
went against the “best interests” of baseball, and cited his “best 
interests” power in refusing to permit the transaction.109 Again, the 
court ruled that “[t]he Commissioner has been given broad pow-
er . . . to investigate any act . . . not in the best interests of baseball, 
to determine what . . . action is appropriate . . . and to take that ac-
tion. [This includes] the . . . power to . . . disapprove the assign-
ments of players.”110 Ultimately, the court again concluded that 
the Commissioner’s broad use of power was permissible given the 
facts of the case.111 
                                                                                                                            
104 See Michael Macklon, The Rise of Labor Unions in Pro Sports, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 25, 
2013), http://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0711/the-rise-of-labor-unions-in-
pro-sports.aspx [https://perma.cc/86QR-AKG2]; see also Tim Marchman, Marvin Miller: 
How the Greatest Union Man in Sports History Shaped the Games We Watch Today, SLATE 
(Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/obit/2012/11/marvin_miller_
dead_how_the_greatest_union_man_in_sports_history_shaped_the.html 
[https://perma.cc/S5DM-D2N2]. 
105 See Michael J. Cozzillio, From the Land of Bondage: The Greening of Major League 
Baseball Players and The Major League Baseball Players Association, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 
117, 137 (1991). 
106 See id. 
107 See generally Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978). 
108 See id. at 531; Benjamin I. Leibovitz, Unnecessary Roughness? A Review of the NFL 
Commissioner’s on-the-Field Disciplinary Powers, 20 SPORTS L.J. 187, 195 (2013). 
109 See Kuhn, 569 F.2d at 531. 
110 Id. at 534. 
111 See id. at 539–40. 
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The NFL has since adopted a similar provision in its CBA, 
where the commissioner may punish players for participating in 
conduct that is detrimental to the League.112 This power has gener-
ally been upheld when challenged in court.113 This power has usual-
ly been upheld because, for a court to hear a case challenging the 
commissioner’s power, it has to interpret the CBA itself in order to 
determine if the commissioner is acting properly, something courts 
are not typically eager to do.114 For example, in 2011, New Orleans 
Saints players and coaches were accused of involvement in a 
scheme where players were paid under the table for targeting key 
opposing players and injuring them; this became known as “Boun-
tygate.”115 Commissioner Goodell suspended four players for their 
participation in the scheme, with the suspensions ranging from 
three games to a full season. Moreover, the head coach was sus-
pended for a full season, the general manager was suspended for 
eight games, the assistant head coach was suspended for six games, 
and the defensive coordinator was suspended indefinitely.116 Addi-
tionally, Commissioner Goodell fined the organization $500,000 
and also made the organization forfeit two second-round draft 
picks.117 After the punishments for “Bountygate” were imposed, 
one of the suspended players, Jonathan Vilma, challenged the 
Commissioner’s power to suspend him by alleging claims of defa-
mation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.118 The 
Commissioner moved to dismiss the two claims, which the court 
                                                                                                                            
112 See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 1(a). 
113 See generally infra Section I.C. 
114 See infra notes 122–28. 
115 See Adriano Pacifici, Scope and Authority of Sports League Commissioner Disciplinary 
Power: Bounty and Beyond, 3 BERKELEY J. ENT. & SPORTS L. 92, 105 (2014). 
116 The defensive coordinator, Gregg Williams, ended up being suspended for the 
remainder of the 2012 season, and was reinstated prior to the start of the 2013 season. See 
generally Ryan Wilson, Gregg Williams on Bountygate: It Was “Nothing That Hadn’t Been 
Done Before,” CBS SPORTS (July 26, 2015), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/eye-on-
football/25250232/gregg-williams-on-bountygate-it-was-nothing-that-hadnt-been-done-
before [https://perma.cc/2W4A-HEFQ]. 
117 See Jonathan Vilma Banned for Year, ESPN (May 3, 2012), http://espn.go.com/
nfl/story/_/id/7881761/nfl-bans-four-players-new-orleans-saints-bounty-roles 
[https://perma.cc/52LV-ELW5]. 
118 See Vilma v. Goodell, 917 F. Supp. 2d 591, 593 (E.D. La. 2013). 
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ultimately granted, because the Labor Management Relation Act119 
(“LMRA”) prevented the court from interpreting the CBA be-
tween the parties.120 In Vilma, the court had to interpret the CBA 
to determine if the Commissioner was acting in accordance with 
the “conduct detrimental” to the League provision.121 The court 
concluded that such an action was not permitted under the 
LMRA.122 
In hearing a case where an arbitrator has already ruled on the 
issue—which is the case in the NFL because an arbitrator oversees 
the appeal of player discipline—courts will rarely overturn the de-
cision of an arbitrator, especially when it comes to interpretation of 
a CBA.123 The arbitration procedural step is mutually agreed upon, 
and labor law’s “private association” principle prevents many 
courts from interpreting the private agreements between parties.124 
The primary rationale behind this principle is that agreements be-
tween private parties should mean something, and should not be 
overturned or subject to interference.125 Though courts will typical-
ly decline to hear a challenge to a Commissioner’s decision in the 
                                                                                                                            
119 Under the LMRA, the power to interpret a CBA in dispute generally belongs to the 
agreed upon person as set forth in the disputed CBA. Under the NFL’s CBA, the body 
entitled to interpret the application of the CBA is an agreed upon arbitrator. See id. at 593, 
595–96. 
120 See id. at 595. 
121 See id. at 596. 
122 See id. at 595–96. 
123 See Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 504 (2001) (ruling 
that the Court of Appeals’ decision to overturn the arbitrator and decide the case on the 
merits was at odds with governing law); E. Assoc. Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 
531 U.S. 57, 67 (2000) (holding that there should be deference to a collectively bargained 
arbitrator’s decision in construing or applying a contract); see also Steelworkers v. Enter. 
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596–97 (1960) (stating that the court will only set aside 
an arbitrator’s ruling in rare instances). 
124 “A most dramatic illustration of this principal occurred in Carr v. St. John’s 
University, . . . 231 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1962), where the court refused to interfere with a 
university’s decision to expel Catholic students who had participated in a civil marriage 
ceremony.” Jan Stiglitz, Player Discipline in Team Sports, 5 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 167, n.38 
(1995); see generally Jeffrey A. Durney, Fair or Foul? The Commissioner and Major League 
Baseball’s Disciplinary Process, 41 EMORY L.J. 581, 630 (1992); Christopher J. McKinny, 
Professional Sports Leagues and the First Amendment: A Closed Marketplace, 13 MARQ. 
SPORTS L. REV. 223, 236 (2003). 
125 See Stiglitz, supra note 124, at n.38. 
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best interests of the sport,126 they will often hear three types of de-
cisions. The first is determining whether the Commissioner acted 
in good faith.127 The second is whether the punishment was issued 
within the Commissioner’s authority.128 The final is if there is a 
challenge to the procedural correctness in the manner that discip-
line was handled.129 
Ultimately, it seems that so long as the parties have agreed to 
the terms of their CBA, the “best interests” and “conduct detri-
mental” clauses grant the commissioner the power to impose dis-
cipline and is legally permissible, and will continue to exist in fu-
ture professional sports’ CBAs. 
C. Current Punishment in the NFL 
Athletes in the NFL are subject to punishment from multiple 
sources. First, the Commissioner has direct authority to discipline 
players under the power of the NFL’s Constitution and Bylaws 
(“NFL Constitution”).130 This power is supported by the NFL’s 
CBA,131 and the terms of the Uniform Players’ Contract (“UPC”), 
which is found in Appendix A of the 2011 CBA.132 Moreover, re-
                                                                                                                            
126 See infra Sections I.C–D.2. 
127 Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 539 (7th Cir. 1978) (deciding that 
the MLB commissioner had acted in good faith, and looking no further into the 
appropriateness of the given punishment). 
128 Atlanta Nat’l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1223 (N.D. Ga. 
1977) (deciding that denying a team a draft choice was outside the scope of the MLB 
commissioner’s disciplinary authority). 
129 Stiglitz, supra note 124, at 176. 
130 See NFL Constitution, supra note 19, at art. VIII §§ 8.6, 8.13, 8.14. 
131 See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46; Logan O’Shaughnessy, After Review: 
An Open Letter to NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell Suggesting that Limiting the League’s 
Disciplinary Power Under the Personal Conduct Policy May Be in the League’s Best Interests, 
88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 527, 530–31 (2011); Matthew J. Parlow, Professional Sports 
League Commissioners’ Authority and Collective Bargaining, 11 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 
179, 187–88 (2010). 
132 See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at app. A. Under the UPC, players can be 
punished by the Commissioner in accordance with the “Integrity of the Game” 
provision. See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at app. A § 15. It states: 
Player . . . acknowledges . . . that if he . . . is guilty of any . . . form of 
conduct reasonably judged by the League Commissioner to be 
detrimental to the League . . . the Commissioner will have the right, 
but only after giving Player the opportunity for a hearing . . . 
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cent developments in the League have given rise to an additional 
source of player punishment: the 2014 Personal Conduct Policy,133 
which was unilaterally implemented by the NFL.134 The Commis-
sioner has full power to levy fines and/or suspensions, for player 
conduct “detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, 
the game of professional football.”135 As a result of these various 
documents, the League, and therefore the commissioner, has broad 
authority to assign punishment136 for not only player conduct dur-
ing games, but also off-the-field player behavior as well.137 
Adding to the complexity of the NFL’s discipline structure, 
players may utilize grievance processes138 in challenging a punish-
ment imposed on them. However, the CBA permits the commis-
sioner to appoint himself as the hearing officer for most forms of 
player discipline.139 Ultimately, the commissioner’s power in over-
seeing these grievances is, like his power to subjectively render the 
initial punishment decision, very strong.140 
                                                                                                                            
to . . . fine Player in a reasonable amount; to suspend Player for a 
period certain or indefinitely; and/or to terminate this contract. 
2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at app. A § 15. 
133 The Personal Conduct Policy is a supplemental document to the NFL’s CBA, which 
provides examples of conduct which will be punished. It also provides specific 
punishments for certain forms of conduct, and provides the Commissioner the power to 
suspend a player, with pay, while an investigation against that player is ongoing. See 
generally 2014 PCP, supra note 21. 
134 See Mike Florio, NFLPA Criticizes “Unilateral” Imposition of Personal Conduct Policy, 
NBCSPORTS: PROFOOTBALL TALK (Dec. 10, 2014, 2:48 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbc
sports.com/2014/12/10/nflpa-criticizes-unilateral-imposition-of-personal-conduct-
policy/ [https://perma.cc/K8QS-ZE73]. 
135 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 1(a). 
136 See, e.g., NFL Constitution, supra note 19, at art. VIII § 8.13(A). 
137 See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 1(a). 
138 A grievance process is the process, enumerated in the CBA, by which someone who 
is being disciplined under the CBA, may appeal that disciplinary decision. See generally 
2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10. 
139 See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 2(a); see also 2014 PCP, supra note 21, 
at 7 (“Appeals of any disciplinary decision will be processed pursuant to Article 46 of the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement.”). 
140 See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 2(a) (stating that the Commissioner 
may appoint himself as the hearing officer in any appeal stemming from on-field conduct 
or off-field conduct deemed to be detrimental to the League). 
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1. Collective Bargaining Agreement & Constitution and 
Bylaws 
To fully understand the Commissioner’s power at the initial 
discipline stage, it is important to start with the current CBA be-
tween the Management and the NFL Players Association 
(“NFLPA”), in conjunction with the NFL Constitution. The NFL 
Constitution and the CBA are two separate documents. While the 
NFL Constitution lays out the basic framework for how the League 
functions and may be amended from time to time,141 the CBA is 
tailored more specifically to various aspects of the League and is 
changed as each CBA period expires to provide for negotiations 
over disputed issues.142 Although the NFL Constitution grants the 
Commissioner the initial power underlying his authority to discip-
line players for their conduct,143 the CBA elaborates further as to 
what conduct the Commissioner is entitled to discipline, and limits 
the Commissioner’s power through its negotiation process.144 
More applicable to recent punishments,145 the current NFL 
CBA (“2011 CBA”), which is the “product of bona fide arm’s 
length collective bargaining”146 between the owners and the 
NFLPA, was officially entered into on August 4, 2011.147 The 2011 
CBA was the end result of the lengthy and contentious bargaining 
that went on between the two sides from 2008 to 2011.148 
                                                                                                                            
141 See Michael R. Wilson, Why So Stern?: The Growing Power of the NBA Commissioner, 
7 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 47 (2010). 
142 See id. at 48. 
143 See NFL Constitution, supra note 19, at art. VIII. 
144 See Wilson, supra note 141, at 48. 
145 See Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 
Nos. 15 Civ. 5916, 15 Civ. 5982 (RMB) (JCF), 2015 WL 5148739, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
3, 2015) (rejecting a defense under Article 46 of the NFL’s current CBA). 
146 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at Preamble. 
147 See id. 
148 After the 2006–2013 CBA had been seen as a “win for the players” due to their 
revenue share, the owners opted out of the CBA in 2008. The two sides negotiated for 
some time, but could not come to an agreement before the end of the 2010–2011 season. 
As a result, the players were locked out, and brought antitrust actions against the League. 
After numerous legal issues were resolved, the two sides ultimately came to an 
agreement, and formed the 2011 CBA. The major sticking point was how the revenue 
would be divided, and though the players ultimately got the share they were seeking, one 
of the concessions they made was the power that the Commissioner would retain over 
player discipline. See Chris Deubert et al., All Four Quarters: A Retrospective and Analysis 
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Under Article XI of the 2006 CBA, the Commissioner was 
permitted to fine or suspend a player for “conduct detrimental to 
the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional 
football.”149 The language implemented in that provision is ex-
tremely broad, as it could be anything perceived as negative, and is 
subjectively determined by the Commissioner.150 Now known as 
the Commissioner’s “Article XLVI Power,” Article XVLI of the 
2011 CBA adopted the same language used in Article XI of the 
2006 CBA in disciplining players “for conduct detrimental to the 
integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional foot-
ball.”151 As such, the only added limitation that was placed on the 
Commissioner’s power in the 2011 CBA was the amount of money 
that the Commissioner could fine players.152 
Under the Commissioner’s Article XLVI power, the only due 
process rights provided to the player who is disciplined is notice of 
the punishment,153 and that a player may only be punished one time 
for a particular incident, by either the player’s team or by the 
League.154 This “One Penalty” due process right was the focal 
point of the Ray Rice case, where Rice’s suspension was over-
turned after the Commissioner extended it based on later seeing 
video of the action.155 There is no requirement for an opportunity 
for the player to be heard, though the NFL may conduct their own 
                                                                                                                            
of the 2011 Collective Bargaining Process and Agreement in the National Football League, 19 
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1, 14–27 (2012); see generally Jeffrey F. Levine & Bram A. Maravent, 
Fumbling Away the Season: Will the Expiration of the NFL-NFLPA CBA Result in the Loss of 
the 2011 Season?, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1419 (2010). 
149 NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement art. XI § 1(a) (2006) [hereinafter 2006 NFL 
CBA]. 
150 See id. 
151 Compare 2006 NFL CBA, supra note 149, at art. XI § 1(a), with 2011 NFL CBA, 
supra note 10, at art. 46 § 1(a). 
152 Under the 2011 CBA, fines can be challenged as being excessive if they exceed 
twenty-five percent of a player’s weekly earnings for the first offense, or fifty percent of a 
player’s weekly earnings for a second offense. See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 
46 § 1(d). 
153 See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 1(a). 
154 See id. at art. 46 § 4. 
155 Darren Heitner, Ray Rice Discipline Brings to Light Poorly Drafted NFL Collective 
Bargaining Agreement, FORBES: SPORTSMONEY (Sept. 11, 2014, 7:52 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2014/09/11/ray-rice-discipline-brings-to-
light-poorly-drafted-nfl-collective-bargaining-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/BAS5-
LU3U]. 
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internal investigation into the alleged action that is the subject of 
discipline.156 Regardless, because the NFL is a private labor organi-
zation, there is no required due process right that they failed to 
provide.157 Any obligations to provide certain due process rights, at 
least in theory, begin and end with the CBA.158 
The players’ grievance process is found under Article XLVI, 
similar to the provision that subjects them to the initial discip-
line.159 For any punishment involving section 1(b) of Article XLVI, 
which covers unsportsmanlike conduct or unnecessary roughness 
penalties on the field of play,160 the NFL and the NFLPA will joint-
ly select two hearing officers for any players challenging punish-
ment under that section.161 For an appeal of any punishment under 
section 1(a), which essentially covers all conduct outside the two 
specified instances under section 1(b),162 the commissioner shall 
appoint one or more individuals to hear the appeal, after consulting 
with the NFLPA.163 Although this may seem like a fair agreement 
to hearing an appeal, it comes with a caveat: “[n]otwithstanding 
the foregoing, the Commissioner may serve as hearing officer in 
any appeal under Section 1(a) of this Article at his discretion.”164 
In adding that provision, the Commissioner is essentially 
granted the power to not only issue an initial punishment, but to be 
the one to uphold the punishment on appeal.165 Because this appeal 
process governs punishments issued pursuant to both the CBA and 
the Personal Conduct Policy,166 the Commissioner is granted tre-
mendous power in player punishment.167 
                                                                                                                            
156 See generally 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10. 
157 See Charles Bennett, Ray Rice and All Other NFL Players Gave Up Their Due Process 
Rights, SPORTS AGENT BLOG (Sept. 9, 2014), http://sportsagentblog.com/2014/09/09/
ray-rice-and-all-other-nfl-players-gave-up-their-due-process-rights/ [https://perma.cc/
3TXF-FVQ5]. 
158 See id. 
159 See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 2. 
160 Id. at art. 46 § 1(b). 
161 See id. at art. 46 § 2(a). 
162 Compare id. at art. 46 § 2(a), with id. at art. 46 § 2(b). 
163 See id. at art. 46 § 2(a). 
164 Id. 
165 See id. 
166 See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 2(a) (stating that the Commissioner 
may appoint himself as the hearing officer in any appeal stemming from on-field conduct 
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Due to the breadth of the Commissioner’s power, it came as no 
surprise that the NFLPA was criticized for continuing to allow 
such power to be delegated to the Commissioner.168 The Commis-
sioner’s current power continues to enable a situation where the 
Commissioner’s discretion is very influential in the determination 
of a player’s discipline. As noted though, the Commissioner’s dis-
cretionary power has been upheld in federal courts in the past.169 
Moreover, both commissioners for other sports and employers im-
posing discipline over unionized employees in other industries are 
accorded similar discretion as well.170 
Though courts will typically decline to rule on whether the 
Commissioner’s actions are in the best interest of the sport, they 
have heard cases in which the Commissioner’s impartiality was 
questioned.171 Though players are almost always precluded from 
bringing suits against the League, Article III of the 2011 CBA per-
mits legal action where a player is claiming the Commissioner has 
breached Articles XVI and XLIII for the player’s right to an “im-
partial arbitrator.”172 Normally, players are precluded from bring-
                                                                                                                            
or off-field conduct deemed to be detrimental to the League); see also 2014 PCP, supra 
note 21, at 7 (stating that “[a]ppeals of any disciplinary decision will be processed 
pursuant to Article 46 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement”). 
167 See, e.g., 2014 PCP, supra note 21, at 7. 
168 See Kevin Van Valkenburg, Power Mad, ESPN (Dec. 28, 2012), 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/8769645/has-nfl-commissioner-roger-goodell-power-
gone-too-far-espn-magazine [https://perma.cc/4JML-7Y2W] (“The commissioner’s 
power exists, after all, only because it’s granted to him by the NFLPA.”). 
169 See, e.g., Milwaukee Am. Ass’n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 304 (N.D. Ill. 1931) 
(upholding baseball Commissioner’s discretionary power to act in the “best interests” of 
the game); see also Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 538 (7th Cir. 
1978) (upholding Commissioner Bowie Kuhn’s right to determine the best interests of 
baseball). 
170 See infra Sections I.D.1–4. 
171 See infra note 179. 
172 See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. III. 
The NFLPA agrees that neither it nor . . . its members . . . will 
sue . . . the NFL . . . provided, however, that nothing contained in this 
Section 2 will prevent the NFLPA or any player from asserting 
that . . . the NFL, has: (1) breached the terms of this 
Agreement . . . and from processing such asserted breach as a non-
injury grievance under Article 43 or asserting any claim before the 
System Arbitrator or the Impartial Arbitrator as provided in this 
Agreement; or (2) breached the terms of the Brady Settlement 
Agreement and from asserting such a claim before the System 
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ing claims against the League in court, but where they challenge the 
hearing officer’s impartiality, they may seek further action in 
court.173 
Recently, when Tom Brady brought suit against the League, he 
did so under Article III’s carve-out provision.174 In having his sus-
pension overturned, Brady provided a huge win for the players’ 
due process rights. As stated before, the Commissioner’s suspen-
sion was overturned because: (1) the NFL provided insufficient 
notice to Brady of such a penalty for a potential violation; (2) the 
NFL failed to provide Brady with access to key witnesses against 
him; and (3) the Commissioner wrongly denied Brady access to the 
files that were the basis of his suspension, at his appeal hearing.175 
Though notice of the penalty/discipline is an explicit due process 
right in the 2011 CBA, the other two grounds for the suspension 
reversal are not so clearly enumerated.176 In overturning Brady’s 
suspension, Judge Berman emphasized that Brady was denied 
access to an impartial arbitrator in his appeal, in accordance with 
Article III, and further that Brady was not provided the due process 
rights that fairness would dictate.177 In overturning Judge Berman’s 
decision though, the Second Circuit rejected this contention, and 
established that Commissioner Goodell was within his discretion to 
be the hearing officer.178 
There have been other instances in which courts have deter-
mined a sports commissioner to not be impartial in hearing a play-
er’s appeal. For example, in Morris v. New York Football Giants, 
Inc., the court determined that the commissioner could not serve as 
                                                                                                                            
Arbitrator, Impartial Arbitrator, or the Appeals Panel, as provided for 
in the Brady Settlement Agreement. 
Id. at art. III § 2. 
173 See id. at art. III § 2. 
174 See Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 
Nos. 15 Civ. 5916, 15 Civ. 5982 (RMB) (JCF), 2015 WL 5148739, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 
2015). 
175 See id. at *12, *16–20. 
176 See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 1(a). 
177 See Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council, 2015 WL 5148739, at *20. 
178 See Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 
No. 15-2801, 2016 WL 1619883, at *12–17 (2d Cir. 2016). 
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a neutral arbitrator.179 In Morris, two players sought compensation 
pursuant to their individual player contracts after they were by 
their team.180 Under the terms of their individual contracts with 
their team (because at the time, there was no CBA in place), their 
actions were brought before the Commissioner, who was to act as 
the neutral arbitrator to settle the dispute.181 After the Commis-
sioner decided against the players, the court overturned his deci-
sion, holding that based on the underlying facts, the Commissioner 
was not neutral.182 Thus, although the court in Morris decided that 
the Commissioner was not neutral, the party seeking to vacate the 
arbitrator’s award based on such evidence still needs to meet a cer-
tain burden in demonstrating that such partiality was present, by 
making an adequate showing of prejudice by the arbitrator.183 
A recent example of the Commissioner appointing himself as 
the hearing officer on appeal after issuing the initial punishment 
occurred during the “Bountygate” scandal.184 When the players 
appealed their punishment, the Commissioner appointed himself 
as the hearing officer, prompting the players to file suit due to his 
lack of impartiality.185 After the suit was brought, Commissioner 
Goodell decided to delegate the appeal to a hearing officer, pur-
suant to Article XL of the CBA at the time,186 appointing ex-
commissioner Paul Tagliabue.187 Though the Commissioner ulti-
mately decided to recuse himself, this was still an instance in which 
the Commissioner’s decision to appoint himself as the hearing of-
ficer raised impartiality concerns.188 
                                                                                                                            
179 See Morris v. N.Y. Football Giants, Inc., 575 N.Y.S.2d 1013, 1016–17 (Cty. S. Ct. 
1991). 
180 See id. at 1014. 
181 See id. 
182 See id. at 1016–17. 
183 See Weber v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 545, 554 
(N.D. Tex. 2006) (holding that plaintiff did not demonstrate that a reasonable person 
would have concluded that the panel or arbitrator was partial to defendant). 
184 See Pacifici, supra note 115, at 106–07. 
185 See id. at 106–10. 
186 See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 2(a). 
187 See Pacifici, supra note 115, at 110–12. 
188 See Jeremy R. Abrams, Making the Right Call: Why Fairness Requires Independent 
Appeals in U.S. Professional Sports Leagues, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 469, 484–89 (2013). 
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As a practical matter, the commissioner cannot serve as the 
hearing officer every time a player challenges a punishment under 
the CBA or Personal Conduct Policy; there are far too many fines 
and suspensions handed out.189 When he does decide to hear ap-
peals though, the impartiality problem naturally arises, as the 
Commissioner’s role as the “judge, jury, and executioner”190 may 
violate the players’ due process rights.191 Such a situation is prob-
lematic because it permits the Commissioner to hear the appeal of 
a punishment he initially imposed, which seems to infringe upon 
the players’ due process right to have an impartial arbitrator. Al-
though the CBA does afford these players the ability to challenge 
the impartiality of the hearing officer in court,192 the judicial 
process is a lengthy and costly one, and a process that could be 
avoided altogether if the commissioner is not been the person that 
hears the appeal in the first place.193 
2. Personal Conduct Policy 
The NFL’s first Personal Conduct Policy was implemented in 
2000, which prohibited a wide variety of off-field violent beha-
vior194 and granted the commissioner exclusive disciplinary author-
                                                                                                                            
189 See 2014 NFL Fines & Suspensions, SPOTRAC, http://www.spotrac.com/nfl/fines-
suspensions/2014 [https://perma.cc/UT79-UGXE] (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). 
190 See Andrew Brandt, Still Judge, Jury, and Executioner, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED: 
MONDAY MORNING QUARTERBACK (Nov. 30, 2014), http://mmqb.si.com/2014/
11/30/ray-rice-wins-appeal-roger-goodell-conduct [https://perma.cc/Y262-WT4F]. 
191 See Ken Belson, Roger Goodell to Hear Tom Brady’s Appeal, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/sports/football/roger-goodell-to-hear-tom-
bradys-appeal.html [https://perma.cc/34SC-JX55]; see also Tony Manfred, The Problem 
With Roger Goodell Putting Himself in Charge of Tom Brady’s Suspension Appeal, BUS. 
INSIDER (May 15, 2015, 10:41 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/goodell-hearing-
brady-appeal-a-problem-2015-5 [https://perma.cc/Z3F4-7JGQ]. 
192 See supra note 173. 
193 For example, the “Deflategate” saga has continued for over one year, and after the 
NFL won its appeal in April 2016, Tom Brady appears to want to continue to fight the 
ruling. See Dan Graf, supra note 57. 
194 See 2014 PCP, supra note 21, at 2. Though almost all of the prohibited forms of 
conduct in the 2014 Personal Conduct Policy are illegal, therefore justifiably punishable 
by the League, there is a prohibition for “[c]onduct that undermines or puts at risk the 
integrity of the NFL, NFL clubs, or NFL personnel.” Id. This means that there is a 
possibility for being suspended for conduct that may be legal. Id. 
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ity for off-field conduct.195 Though the League has not imple-
mented further versions of the policy on an annual basis, they have 
revised and added new versions of the policy to address specific 
concerns.196 The Personal Conduct Policy provides further elabora-
tion as to what players may be punished for, as well as adds to the 
Commissioner’s disciplinary power, acting as a supplement to the 
League’s CBA.197 
The most recent version of the Personal Conduct Policy was 
passed by Commissioner Goodell on December 10, 2014, only one 
year after the preceding version of the policy, in response to cases 
of domestic violence that some the League’s players were involved 
in.198 The 2014 policy was enacted unilaterally by the Commission-
er after the owners agreed to it, without any input from the 
NFLPA.199 The NFLPA did not take very kindly to the 2014 Per-
sonal Conduct Policy because they were not involved in its enact-
ment.200 This raised legitimate questions as to whether the policy’s 
implementation was proper, not only under the NFL’s CBA,201 but 
also under fundamental labor law principles governing unilateral 
action taken by an employer.202 Here, however, the Commissioner 
                                                                                                                            
195 See Kelly M. Vaughan, First and Goal: How the NFL’s Personal Conduct Policy 
Complies with Federal Antitrust Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 609, 614 (2011). 
196 For example, the League implemented a new policy in 2008 where it extended 
potential suspension lengths for violations, and permitted discipline even where a player 
was not convicted of a crime. See id. 
197 See generally 2014 PCP, supra note 21. 
198 See generally id.; 2013 PCP, supra note 29. 
199 See Tom Pelissero, NFL Owners Pass New Personal Conduct Policy, USA TODAY 
(Dec. 10, 2014, 4:12 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2014/12/10/
roger-goodell-nfl-owners-personal-conduct-policy/20199033/ [https://perma.cc/8G8M-
PMPE]. 
200 See Michael O’Keeffe, NFL Players Union Files Grievance vs. NFL over New Personal 
Conduct Policy, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 23, 2015) http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/
football/nflpa-files-grievance-nfl-new-conduct-policy-article-1.2089402 
[https://perma.cc/T2BB-2MJH]. 
201 See Casinova O. Henderson, How Much Discretion Is Too Much for the NFL 
Commissioner to Have over the Players’ Off-the-Field Conduct?, 17 SPORTS L.J. 167, 180–81 
(2010). 
202 For example, under section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, an employer is 
required to “confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms of 
conditions of employment.” National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158 
(2016); see NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 746–47 (1962) (holding that the duty to bargain 
between management and a union extends to the terms explicitly listed under § 8(d)). But 
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claimed to have enacted the new policy “pursuant to [his] authori-
ty under the Constitution and Bylaws,”203 though the CBA does 
not grant him the express power to enact policies such as the Per-
sonal Conduct Policy. In fact, the CBA “supersede[s] any conflict-
ing provisions in . . . the NFL Constitution and Bylaws, the NFL 
Rules, or any other document affecting terms and conditions of 
employment of NFL players.”204 Moreover, though the NFLPA 
challenged the NFL’s implementation of the 2014 Personal Con-
duct Policy as a “document affecting terms and conditions of em-
ployment” and argued that it should be superseded by the CBA, 
their non-injury grievance to a third-party arbitrator remains unre-
solved to this point.205 Opposing the new policy, however, might 
not end well for either side, as domestic violence has been a major 
problem for the League,206 and this policy was a serious effort in 
order to combat it.207 Though it may be argued that a full revision 
of the Personal Conduct Policy is not necessary, and is instead just 
a revision to address the domestic violence problem, the new policy 
adds more than merely a domestic violence provision.208 
The 2014 version provides even more disciplinary control to 
the League than the 2013 version, as players may be placed on the 
“Commissioner Exempt List”—which allows leave with pay—
while an investigation is ongoing.209 This sort of power usually does 
                                                                                                                            
see NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 350 (1958) (holding that 
not every action taken by an employer must be bargained over). 
203 See 2014 PCP, supra note 21, at 1. 
204 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. II § 1. 
205 See Tom Pelissero, NFL, NFLPA Reach Settlement on Contempt Motion in Adrian 
Peterson Case, USA TODAY (Sept. 26, 2015, 9:08 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
sports/nfl/vikings/2015/09/25/nfl-nflpa-adrian-peterson-case-dismiss-civil-contempt-
motion/72837158/ [https://perma.cc/LUH4-YVFS]. 
206 Benjamin Morris, The Rate of Domestic Violence Arrests Among NFL Players, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 31, 2014, 12:50 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/the-
rate-of-domestic-violence-arrests-among-nfl-players/ [https://perma.cc/T6KX-8L2T]. 
207 See id.; see also Josh Levs, NFL Toughens Policy Addressing Assault and Domestic 
Violence, CNN (Dec. 10, 2014, 10:45 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/10/us/nfl-
conduct/ [https://perma.cc/4HT9-3F6J]. 
208 See generally 2014 PCP, supra note 21. 
209 See Ken Belson, N.F.L. Sets Strict Rules for Actions Off Field, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/11/sports/football/roger-goodell-wont-assess-
penalties-under-revised-conduct-policy.html [https://perma.cc/EXN9-E8WV]; see 
generally 2013 PCP, supra note 29. 
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not exist in other comparable sports, or industries.210 Additionally, 
the 2014 policy directly addresses the domestic violence issue that 
plagued the League.211 The revised 2014 Personal Conduct Policy 
explicitly lists domestic violence, as well as other violent crimes, as 
conduct which will be disciplined, unlike previous personal con-
duct policies.212 Under the 2014 Personal Conduct Policy, there is a 
prescribed six-game suspension for a first offense of one of the 
listed examples, with consideration given to aggravating or mitigat-
ing factors in increasing or decreasing the suspension.213 The policy 
lists other types of violations or potential “detrimental” acts214 that 
would warrant such discipline, but does not limit the potential vi-
olations to that specific list.215 The 2014 policy also addresses a po-
tential repeat offender, with a lifetime banishment penalty for 
someone who commits a second violation of one of the specified 
acts.216 A player who has received a lifetime banishment may peti-
tion the Commissioner for reinstatement after one year.217 
                                                                                                                            
210 See infra Sections I.D.1–3. 
211 See generally Levs, supra note 207. 
212 See 2014 PCP, supra note 21, at 2. 
213 Id. at 6. 
214 That list includes: 
Actual or threatened physical violence against another person, 
including dating violence, domestic violence, child abuse, and other 
forms of family violence; Assault and/or battery, including sexual 
assault or other sex offenses; Violent or threatening behavior toward 
another employee or a third party in any workplace setting; Stalking, 
harassment, or similar forms of intimidation; Illegal possession of a 
gun or other weapon (such as explosives, toxic substances, and the 
like), or possession of a gun or other weapon in any workplace setting; 
Illegal possession, use, or distribution of alcohol or drugs; Possession, 
use, or distribution of steroids or other performance enhancing 
substances; Crimes involving cruelty to animals as defined by state or 
federal law; Crimes of dishonesty such as blackmail, extortion, fraud, 
money laundering, or racketeering; Theft-related crimes such as 
burglary, robbery, or larceny; Disorderly conduct; Crimes against law 
enforcement, such as obstruction, resisting arrest, or harming a police 
officer or other law enforcement officer; Conduct that poses a 
genuine danger to the safety and well-being of another person; and 
Conduct that undermines or puts at risk the integrity of the NFL, 
NFL clubs, or NFL personnel. 
2014 PCP, supra note 21, at 2 (emphasis added). 
215 See id. 
216 See id. 
217 See id. 
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In terms of its language, the new 2014 Personal Conduct Policy 
uses the same punishment for “conduct detrimental” language 
that is included in the Commissioner’s Article XLVI power.218 Ad-
ditionally, the Policy does not limit discipline to players who are 
convicted of a proscribed violation;219 a mere accusation is enough 
to warrant a fine or suspension.220 
The 2014 Policy appears, on its face, to restrict the Commis-
sioner’s power to discipline players for “conduct detrimental.”221 
Although an initial disciplinary decision is “made or recommended 
by a disciplinary officer,” the decision is made under the delegated 
authority of the Commissioner.222 Additionally, the 2014 Policy 
does not provide much of a limitation on the Commissioner’s pow-
er at the player grievance stage. 
Players challenging any discipline imposed on them under the 
Personal Conduct Policy must follow the same procedures that are 
set forth under Article XLVI of the CBA.223 Since the Commis-
sioner retains the power to discipline players under the Personal 
Conduct Policy, his ability to hear the appeal presents a similar is-
sue of impartiality as an arbitrator, and whether this infringes on 
the due process rights of the players.224 Although courts will typi-
cally defer to the contracts made between unions and Management, 
when there is clear partiality in the appeal process they may decide 
to overturn the appeal decision and have it re-heard.225 As dis-
cussed above, players may challenge the commissioner’s neutrality 
                                                                                                                            
218 Compare 2014 PCP, supra note 21, at 1, with 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 
§ 1(a). 
219 See 2014 PCP, supra note 21, at 2; Bethany Withers, The Integrity of the Game: 
Professional Athletes and Domestic Violence, 1 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 145, 174–76 
(2010) (noting examples where players have been disciplined by the League and 
subsequently been found not guilty of criminal charges). 
220 See 2014 PCP, supra note 21, at 2. 
221 See id. at 1, 5 (“Everyone who is part of the league must refrain from ‘conduct 
detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in’ the NFL . . . . You have violated 
this policy . . . if the evidence gathered by the league’s investigation demonstrates that 
you engaged in conduct prohibited by the Personal Conduct Policy.”). 
222 Id. at 6. 
223 See supra note 163. 
224 See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46. 
225 See Weber v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 545, 554 
(N.D. Tex. 2006) (holding that plaintiff did not demonstrate that a reasonable person 
would have concluded that the panel or arbitrator was partial to defendant). 
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in hearing the appeal under Article III when they feel they aren’t 
being provided their right under the CBA to an impartial arbitrator 
under Articles XVI and XLIII.226 
Whether the various avenues of discipline and the due process 
and appeal rights the players have throughout the process conform 
to what is expected in normal labor contexts is a complicated issue. 
In order to make such a determination, it is crucial to look at how 
discipline, and the rights of employees, or players, in other contexts 
is handled. 
D. Punishment in Other Contexts 
1. Major League Baseball 
In MLB, the Commissioner’s power to discipline players at the 
initial stage lies in its Constitution and Bylaws,227 its CBA,228 and 
the recently enacted Domestic Violence Policy.229 In the CBA, the 
Commissioner’s power is explicitly laid out under Article XII and 
is similarly worded as the current CBA in the NFL.230 Under Ar-
ticle XII, the Commissioner may discipline “[p]layers . . . for just 
cause for conduct that is materially detrimental or materially pre-
judicial to the best interests of Baseball . . . .”231 The CBA then 
provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of conduct that would 
fall under this “best interests” clause.232 Although the “best inter-
ests” clause is a broad grant of power, it does come with some limi-
tations, as compared to the NFL.233 Although both CBAs have a 
notice requirement to the disciplined player, the NFL is not re-
quired to have the same investigation step prior to issuing discip-
                                                                                                                            
226 See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. III. 
227 Major League Baseball Constitution (2005) [hereinafter MLB Constitution]. 
228 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 8. 
229 MLB Joint Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault, and Child Abuse Policy (2015) 
[hereinafter MLB DAP]. 
230 Compare 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 8, at art. XII § B, with 2011 NFL CBA, supra 
note 10, at art. 46 § 1(a). 
231 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 8, at art. XII § B. 
232 See id. 
233 Compare 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 8, at art. XII, with 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 
10, at art. 46. 
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line as the MLB.234 Additionally, the MLB’s grievance procedure, 
as discussed below, provides a greater limitation on MLB commis-
sioner powers than the NFL provides. 
The broad grant of the “best interests” power can be proble-
matic though. Although Article XII prohibits “conduct in violation 
of federal, state or local law,”235 players may be disciplined for oth-
er bad—albeit legal—behavior, as well. For example, John Rocker 
was suspended by then-Commissioner Bud Selig in 2000 after a 
racist rant Sports Illustrated, when asked if he would ever play for 
the New York Mets.236 Rocker’s suspension marked the first time a 
player had been disciplined for speech.237 Though inflammatory, 
Rocker’s conduct did not fall under the “in violation of federal, 
state or local law” language, thus, the decision to discipline was 
made pursuant to the “best interests” clause. Although a player 
probably understands that making racist remarks will likely damage 
his own public image, it is perhaps not as easy for that player to see 
how his words would cause damage to the entire sport. Indeed, as 
Rocker was the first to be disciplined for this behavior, players may 
not always know what actually constitutes conduct that is detri-
mental to baseball’s “best interests.” 
Possible solutions to rectify the vagueness of the “best inter-
ests” clause are also problematic. For example, due to the unpre-
dictable nature of player conduct, instituting an exhaustive list of 
all possible violations is not feasible. Moreover, leaving discipline 
power to individual franchise owners would likely create even more 
ambiguity, as discipline would be imposed on a team-by-team basis, 
rather than league-wide. By granting power to the Commissioner, 
in theory, the Commissioner would be looking towards balancing 
punishment with the best interests of the entire league. “[T]he ra-
                                                                                                                            
234 Under MLB’s CBA, the League is required to conduct an investigation into a 
potential misconduct violation before imposing discipline; the NFL does not have such a 
requirement. Compare 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 8, at art. XII §§ C, D; with 2011 NFL 
CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46. 
235 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 8, at art. XII § B. 
236 See Leibovitz, supra note 108, at 199; see also Murray Chass, Baseball Suspends Rocker 
Till May for Comments, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/
02/01/sports/baseball-baseball-suspends-rocker-till-may-for-comments.html 
[https://perma.cc/7F7W-45HJ]. 
237 See Chass, supra note 236. 
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tionale behind granting the Commissioner the power to overrule 
the owners lies in a fundamental conflict of interest for the owners, 
whose financial incentives are not wholly attached to the success of 
MLB, but also to the success of their individual teams.”238 Despite 
the potential confusion over what conduct would be prohibited due 
to the breadth of Commissioner power, the power has been upheld 
by federal courts.239 
More recently, the MLB decided to enact a Domestic Violence 
Policy, granting the Commissioner additional power that is not 
contained in either the Constitution or CBA. The MLB’s recent 
implementation of the Domestic Violence Policy can be traced to 
the NFL’s decision to do so.240 Domestic violence is a serious issue 
in the MLB, and the League is doing whatever it can to curtail such 
behavior.241 Under the Domestic Violence Policy, the Commis-
sioner enjoys a tremendous amount of discretionary power in ren-
dering a disciplinary decision.242 By the policy’s own terms, “the 
Commissioner can issue the discipline he believes is appropriate in 
light of the severity of the conduct.”243 Further, the Commissioner 
may suspend the player up to seven days while conducting an in-
vestigation into the matter, and may even suspend the player, with 
pay, prior to the conclusion of any legal proceeding.244 Under the 
policy, the Commissioner retains the exclusive power to discipline 
players, though he may defer to the player’s respective team to im-
pose punishment.245 Lastly, similar to the NFL’s Personal Conduct 
                                                                                                                            
238 Craig F. Arcella, Major League Baseball’s Disempowered Commissioner: Judicial 
Ramifications of the 1994 Restructuring, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2420, 2424 (1997). 
239 See generally Milwaukee Am. Ass’n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298 (N.D. Ill. 1931); see also 
Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 538 (7th Cir. 1978) (upholding 
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn’s right to determine the best interests of baseball). 
240 See David Lennon, MLB Learns From NFL’s Mistake, Implementing Domestic Violence 
Education Program, NEWSDAY (Feb. 28, 2015, 8:40 PM), http://www.newsday.com/
sports/columnists/david-lennon/mlb-learns-from-nfl-s-mistake-implementing-domestic-
violence-education-program-1.9990592 [https://perma.cc/58VY-JAKU]. 
241 See Mike Bates, MLB’s Record on Domestic Violence Worse Than NFL’s, SBNATION 
(July 28, 2014, 1:10 PM), http://www.sbnation.com/mlb/2014/7/28/5936835/ray-rice-
chuck-knoblauch-minnesota-twins-mlb-domestic-abuse-violence [https://perma.cc/R6
SR-EMF6]. 
242 See MLB DAP, supra note 229, § C. 
243 Id. 
244 See id. § B. 
245 See id. § C. 
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Policy, the player does not need to be convicted.246 Aroldis Chap-
man, pitcher for the New York Yankees, was the first player sus-
pended under this new policy, for 30 games on March 1, 2016.247 
The MLB and NFL disciplinary structures are very similar in 
terms of how initial punishment is handled. Under the CBA, the 
MLB’s power to discipline players to protect the “best interests” 
of baseball is similar to the NFL’s power to discipline players for 
“conduct detrimental” to the League.248 Under both clauses, play-
ers can be disciplined on a subjective determination made by the 
Commissioner. Since the MLB laid the ground work for Commis-
sioner power,249 it seems that the NFL modeled their Commis-
sioner’s power after the MLB. Moreover, in each sport, in addition 
to the power granted to each Commissioner under their respective 
CBAs, there are additional sources that provide the Commissioners 
with the ability to levy punishment to discipline players.250 
Notably, the MLB’s recent Domestic Violence Policy provides 
the MLB Commissioner with slightly more discretionary power 
than does the NFL’s. In the MLB’s Domestic Violence Policy, 
there are no maximum or minimum limitations to the discipline 
that may be imposed on a player.251 In the NFL’s new Personal 
Conduct Policy, the Commissioner can issue a baseline, six-game 
suspension on the first violation, and a lifetime ban for a subse-
quent domestic violence violation.252 Under the MLB’s policy, the 
Commissioner may issue a lifetime ban immediately, if the situa-
                                                                                                                            
246 See id. 
247 Paul Hagen & Bryan Hoch, Chapman Gets 30-Game Suspension from MLB, MLB.COM 
(Mar. 1, 2016), http://m.mlb.com/news/article/165860226/yankees-aroldis-chapman-
suspended-30-games [https://perma.cc/HF6Q-5DV5]. Jose Reyes, the Colorado 
Rockies’ shortstop, was also involved in a domestic violence dispute, and though charges 
were dropped, he was placed on paid leave February 23, 2016, not to be reinstated until 
May 31, 2016; missing fifty-one games. See Andrew Joseph, Jose Reyes Returns to Rockies, 
Vows to Be “A Better Man, A Better Husband,” USA TODAY (May 19, 2016), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2016/05/19/jose-reyes-returns-rockies-
vows-better-man-better-husband/84598918/ [https://perma.cc/KB3V-CH7X]. 
248 Compare 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 8, at art. XII, with 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 
10, at art. 46. 
249 See supra note 98. 
250 See, e.g., MLB DAP, supra note 229; see also 2014 PCP, supra note 21. 
251 See generally MLB DAP, supra note 229. 
252 See 2014 PCP, supra note 21, at 6. 
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tion were to warrant it. On the other hand, where a six-game sus-
pension in the NFL may not be appropriate in all instances, the 
MLB may impose a lesser suspension in those situations. Though 
the NFL’s Commissioner may take into account any mitigating or 
aggravating factors to better fit punishment, he must start with the 
prescribed six game or lifetime ban before doing so.253 In the MLB, 
such a starting point is not necessary, so the MLB’s Commissioner 
may have a better starting point for a minor or severe violations.254 
The grievance procedures in MLB are unique to each source of 
punishment power. Under the CBA, players can challenge pu-
nishment stemming from their on-field conduct, or for all other 
grievances, including off-field conduct.255 For discipline taken 
against a player stemming from an on-field incident, such as fight-
ing or interfering with an umpire, a grievance would be heard in 
front of the Executive Vice President, Administration, or the 
Commissioner himself.256 The grievance procedure for any other 
appeal is different from the procedure for on-field conduct discip-
line.257 Under this sort of grievance filing, the grievance must first 
be brought up to the player’s club, then to the League’s Labor Re-
lations Department, before finally being heard in front of an arbitra-
tion panel.258 The arbitration panel is formed by each party select-
ing one arbitrator, and then agreeing on an “impartial” third arbi-
trator.259 If the parties cannot agree on a third, “impartial” arbitra-
tor, then a list from the American Arbitration Association is pro-
vided until the parties narrow the list down to one.260 The third 
impartial arbitrator may be fired by either party, so long as they are 
not handling a case at the time.261 Notably, the CBA does not grant 
the Commissioner authority to appoint himself as the arbitrator to 
                                                                                                                            
253 See id. 
254 See MLB DAP, supra note 229. 
255 See 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 8, at art. XI §§ B–C. 
256 See id. at art. XI § C(1)(a)–(b). 
257 See id. at art. XI § B. 
258 See id. 
259 See id. at art. XI § A(9). 
260 See id. 
261 See id. 
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hear an appeal filed for off-field conduct, as compared to the 
NFL.262 
Under the MLB’s new Domestic Violence policy, the same 
three-person arbitration panel is used in hearing a player’s griev-
ance over punishment issued.263 Because there are no maximum or 
minimum limitations to the Commissioner’s discipline, the panel 
uses a “just cause” standard, where the punishment must reflect 
the “cause,” or severity of the violation.264 The arbitration panel 
may also, on their own, weigh the various aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors that played a role in the punishment determination.265 
In comparison to the NFL, the MLB grievance procedures do 
not permit the Commissioner to hear appeals for off-field discip-
line. These types of appeals are heard in front of a three-member 
arbitration panel, where each party gets to select an arbitrator, be-
fore agreeing upon the third.266 In the NFL, the Commissioner may 
hear the appeal himself, and when he does appoint a hearing offic-
er, the Commissioner merely has to consult with the NFLPA Ex-
ecutive Director prior to appointing a hearing officer.267 The 
NFLPA does not get to choose one of the hearing officers, meaning 
the Commissioner has the exclusive power to determine who will 
hear the case.268 The MLB, on the other hand, grants more power 
to the players in the appeal process, in terms of determining who 
will be hearing the appeal. 
2. National Basketball Association 
Unlike the NFL or the MLB, the NBA’s commissioner power 
to discipline at the initial stage is derived only from the NBA’s 
Constitution and Bylaws, and is limited by its CBA.269 Under the 
NBA’s Constitution and Bylaws, the Commissioner may discipline 
a player “for any statement he makes or endorses which is prejudi-
                                                                                                                            
262 See id. at art. XI. 
263 See MLB DAP, supra note 229, at § C. 
264 See id. 
265 See id. 
266 See 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 8, at art. XI § A(9). 
267 See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 2(a). 
268 See id. 
269 See NBA Constitution and Bylaws, at art. 35 §§ (c)–(d) (2012) [hereinafter NBA 
Constitution]. 
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cial or detrimental to the best interests of basketball and to suspend 
or fine the player for conduct that is detrimental to the NBA.”270 
Further, the Commissioner has the power to discipline players for 
being “guilty of conduct that does not conform to standards of mo-
rality and fair play.”271 
Under the language of the NBA’s Constitution and Bylaws, the 
Commissioner is accorded the same discretionary power in issuing 
punishment to a player as the MLB and NFL.272 The Latrell Spre-
well incident in the late 1990s was an example of how arbitrators 
and courts treat the NBA Commissioner’s power under the Con-
stitution and Bylaws, and the CBA.273 In 1997, Latrell Sprewell, a 
then-NBA player, physically assaulted his coach P.J. Carlesimo, to 
the point of choking him with his bare hands.274 David Stern, the 
NBA Commissioner at the time, suspended Sprewell for a full ca-
lendar year following the incident, pursuant to his authority under 
the Constitution’s “best interests” clause.275 On appeal, the 
Grievance Arbitrator reduced the discipline issued by the Commis-
sioner, after determining that reducing the suspension to the re-
mainder of the season was more fair.276 The court upheld the arbi-
trator’s ruling when Sprewell brought suit to have the arbitration 
award vacated.277 This case was crucial in defining the modern day 
limitations on the NBA’s Commissioner power to discipline play-
ers. 
Much like the MLB Commissioner’s disciplinary power, the 
NBA’s Commissioner has similar discretionary power to discipline 
players as the NFL’s Commissioner. The NBA has the same “best 
interests” clause implemented in its Constitution that the MLB 
                                                                                                                            
270 Robert I. Lockwood, The Best Interests of the League: Referee Betting Scandal Brings 
Commissioner Authority and Collective Bargaining Back to the Frontcourt in the NBA, 15 
SPORTS L.J. 137, 151 (2008); see NBA Constitution, supra note 269, at art. 35 § (d)(i). 
271 NBA Constitution, supra note 269, at art. 35 § (d). 
272 Compare id. at art. 35 §§ (c)–(d), with 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 8, at art. XII § B, 
and 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 1(a). 
273 See generally Roger A. Javier, You Cannot Choke Your Boss & Hold Your Job Unless 
You Play in the NBA: The Latrell Sprewell Incident Undermines Disciplinary Authority in the 
NBA, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 209, 210–12 (2000). 
274 See id. at 211. 
275 Lockwood, supra note 270, at 153–54. 
276 See id. at 155. 
277 See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 986–88 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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has in its CBA, and this “best interests” clause, as discussed 
above, functions in a similar way that the NFL’s “conduct detri-
mental” to the League clause functions.278 Although the NBA does 
not have separate documents specifically for domestic violence or 
drug use prevention, as the MLB and NFL do, punishment under 
the “best interests” clause has come with stricter scrutiny on ap-
peal.279 
Prior to the Sprewell case, the NBA Commissioner’s decision 
over player punishment was not heavily scrutinized by an arbitra-
tor. Although history has supported a Commissioner’s ability to act 
within a broad discretionary range of power in order to protect the 
best interests of their respective League, the overturning of Spre-
well’s suspension set a fair and reasonable standard on the discip-
line imposed by the NBA Commissioner. This is not to say NBA 
Commissioners have acted egregiously in the past, it simply means 
their punishment decisions are to be analyzed more critically upon 
appeal. 
The grievance procedures accorded to players under the 
NBA’s CBA is different from the analogous MLB and NFL proce-
dures.280 The NBA uses a Grievance Arbitrator and a Player Dis-
cipline Arbitrator.281 A System Arbitrator handles disputes primari-
ly arising out of salary or contract disputes between the Player and 
his team, and is thus not central to the topic of discipline.282 
Whether a discipline appeal goes to the Grievance Arbitrator or 
the Player Discipline Arbitrator depends on the severity of the dis-
cipline.283 If the discipline is a fine of less than $50,000, a suspen-
sion less than twelve games, or a combination of the two, then the 
                                                                                                                            
278 Compare NBA Constitution, supra note 269, at art. 35 § (d)(i), with 2012 MLB CBA, 
supra note 8, at art. XII § B, and 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 2(a). 
279 See Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 986–88. 
280 Compare NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. XXXI § 9 (2011) [hereinafter 
NBA CBA], with 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 8, at art. XI, and 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 
10, at arts. 43–44 § 2(a). 
281 See NBA CBA, supra note 280, at art. XXXI §§ 1(a)(i), 9(a); see also Jeffrey A. 
Mishkin, Dispute Resolution in the NBA: The Allocation of Decision Making Among the 
Commissioner, Impartial Arbitrator, System Arbitrator, and the Courts, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 
449, 453–58 (2001). 
282 See NBA CBA, supra note 280, at art. XXXII § 1. 
283 See id. at art. XXXI § 9. 
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player must first appeal to the Commissioner.284 After the Com-
missioner hears the appeal and renders a decision, the player may 
then file a subsequent appeal to the Player Discipline Arbitrator, 
whose decision is final and binding.285 The Player Discipline Arbi-
trator is a single person, with NBA experience (ex-player, coach, 
front office executive, etc.), and is agreed upon by both sides.286 
Either side may terminate him through a written submission during 
the period of November 1 through December 1, each year of the 
CBA’s duration.287 The procedure of the initial Commissioner 
hearing, followed by an appeal to the Player Discipline Arbitrator, 
is also used for discipline imposed due to in-game conduct.288 
If, however, the suspension is more than twelve games, or the 
fine exceeds $50,000, then the appeal goes to the Grievance Arbi-
trator.289 The Grievance Arbitrator, as used in the Sprewell inci-
dent, is decided at the outset of the CBA and is a single person 
agreed upon by both the NBAPA and the owners.290 The Griev-
ance Arbitrator remains in that position for the duration of the 
CBA;291 however, there is a six day window from July 27 until Au-
gust 1 each year in which either party may remove the Grievance 
Arbitrator, or the Grievance Arbitrator may step down on his 
own.292 The Grievance Arbitrator handles the appeal of off-court 
discipline and on-court discipline that is a fine in excess of $50,000 
or a suspension in excess of twelve games.293 
The NBA’s grievance process somewhat resembles a combina-
tion of the NFL and MLB grievance procedures. In the NFL, the 
Commissioner has the discretion to appoint himself to hear the ap-
peal for just about any case that he wants to.294 In the MLB, the 
Commissioner never has the right to hear an appeal following a dis-
                                                                                                                            
284 See id. at art. XXXI § 9(a)(1)–(5). 
285 See id. at art. XXXI § 9(a)(5)(a)–(f). 
286 See id. at art. XXXI § 9(a)(5)(d). 
287 See id. at art. XXXI § 9(a)(5)(e). 
288 See id. at art. XXXI § 9(a). 
289 See id. at art. XXXI § 9(b). 
290 See id. at art. XXXI § 7(a). 
291 See id. 
292 See id. at art. XXXI § 7(a)–(b). 
293 See id. at art. XXXI § 9(b). 
294 See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 1(a). 
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ciplinary decision that he made.295 Here, the Commissioner does 
have the authority to hear an appeal following his own disciplinary 
decision, but only for smaller punishments that are issued.296 Addi-
tionally, even when the NBA’s Commissioner hears an appeal for a 
small punishment, the Commissioner’s decision can be appealed 
further to the Player Discipline Arbitrator,297 which is not a possi-
bility in the NFL’s appeal structure.298 Drawing a distinction be-
tween what constitutes on-court or off-court behavior is not always 
clear, though. 
In the infamous melee that took place at the Palace of Auburn 
Hills in Detroit, the Detroit Pistons and Indiana Pacers got into a 
huge fight that has come to be known as the “Malice in the Pa-
lace.”299 After Ben Wallace was fouled by Ron Artest, players from 
both teams got into a skirmish on the court.300 The fight spilled in-
to the crowd, and after a fan threw a beer at Artest, he went into 
the stands to fight the fan.301 Following the fight, three players that 
were suspended subsequently filed appeals, and though the fight 
transpired on the court, the Grievance Arbitrator heard the ap-
peal.302 The Commissioner believed that he should be the one to 
hear the appeal, because the fight took place on the court, or in-
game.303 After the Arbitrator reduced Jermaine O’Neal’s suspen-
sion from twenty-five to fifteen games,304 Commissioner Stern 
brought suit and continued to argue that the discipline was issued 
for conduct that occurred on the court, and was thus under his ex-
clusive jurisdiction.305 The judge sided with the arbitrator though, 
                                                                                                                            
295 See 2012 MLB CBA, supra note 8, at art. XI. 
296 See NBA CBA, supra note 280, at art. XXXI § 9(a). 
297 See id. at art. XXXI § 9(a)(5)(a)–(f). 
298 See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46. 
299 See David Sirotkin, Disciplining the Disciplinary Systems in Professional Sports: An 
Attempt to Fix the Arbitrary and Overreaching Disciplinary Powers of Sports Commissioners, 
11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 289, 306 (2009). 
300 See Jonathan Abrams, The Malice at the Palace, GRANTLAND (March 20, 2012), 
http://grantland.com/features/an-oral-history-malice-palace/ [https://perma.cc/89C5-
FX7C]. 
301 See id. 
302 See Sirotkin, supra note 299, at 306. 
303 See id. at 306–07. 
304 See id. at 307. 
305 Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, No. 04 Civ. 9528, 2005 
WL 22869, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
2016] COMMISSIONER’S POWER & PLAYERS’ RIGHTS 1093 
 
and reasoned that the conduct was so external to the game that it 
could not possibly have been contemplated as constituting conduct 
“on the playing court.”306 The court stated that fighting with a 
spectator, which O’Neal was involved in, “has never been charac-
terized as conduct on the playing court.”307 Ultimately, the court 
affirmed the arbitrator’s reduction to O’Neal’s suspension.308 
Comparing the NFL Commissioner’s discretionary authority 
to other sports entire disciplinary process is useful to gauge its ap-
propriateness. Comparing the power to other industries, however, 
will shed even more light on what kind of power is appropriate in 
disciplining employees. 
3. United Auto Workers’ Union–Ford Motor Company 
It is important to compare the NFL’s disciplinary system to 
another industry, here the auto industry, to bring a different pers-
pective as to how unionized employees, outside of the sports con-
text, are disciplined by their superiors. In order to compare the 
NFL to the auto industry, the agreement between the United Au-
tomobile Workers Union (“UAW”) and Ford Motor Company 
will be examined. The UAW is one of the primary labor organiza-
tions representing employees in the auto industry,309 while Ford is 
one of the most historically successful automobile companies.310 
Looking at how Ford employees can be disciplined will display a 
pretty good idea as to how the auto industry deals with employee 
discipline. 
In the UAW–Ford CBA, the power authorized to the employ-
er, or supervisor in this instance, can be found in the Discipline and 
Discharge section located under Company Responsibility.311 That 
section states “[t]he Company retains the sole right to discipline 
                                                                                                                            
306 See id. at *10–11. 
307 Id. at *10. 
308 See id. at *11. 
309 See Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., The Decline and Resurgence of the U.S. Auto 
Industry, ECON. POL’Y INST. (May 6, 2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/the-decline-
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311 See Agreements Between UAW and the Ford Motor Company (2011), at art. V § 2 
[hereinafter UAW CBA]. 
1094 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:1051 
 
and discharge employees for cause, provided that in the exercise of 
this right it will not act wrongfully or unjustly or in violation of the 
terms of this Agreement.”312 The section then goes on to say that 
any prior violations that took place more than two years ago are not 
counted in assessing the appropriate discipline.313 However, the 
CBA never really provides a more elaborate definition of what 
should constitute “cause” for discipline.314 The Company Respon-
sibility section also provides for an opportunity to discuss the po-
tential discipline between the employer and employee, presumably 
to give the employee a chance to defend himself before discipline is 
imposed.315 
Ford’s Code of Conduct offers more examples of types of 
workplace behavior could warrant disciplinary measures.316 Some 
of the workplace behavior that could be disciplined are: discrimina-
tory hiring practices,317 any form of harassment in the workplace,318 
health and safety violations,319 and violation of the substance abuse 
policy.320 Under each of these sections in the handbook, there are 
no set guidelines as to what punishment could be, where any viola-
tion of the handbook would subject the employee to discretionary 
punishment.321 The language that is used to give any guidance as to 
what the punishment could be is that “Violation . . . may result in 
discipline, up to and including termination or release.”322 
Recently, in a Ford plant in Chicago, a female employee filed a 
civil suit against the company because she had been sexually ha-
rassed in the workplace.323 Ford responded to this suit by terminat-
                                                                                                                            
312 See id. at art. V § 2. 
313 See id. 
314 See id. 
315 See id. 
316 See Ford Code of Conduct Handbook: Corporate Policies and Directives (Nov. 
2007) at 9–14 [hereinafter Ford Code]. 
317 See id. at 11. 
318 See id. at 12. 
319 See id. at 13. 
320 See id. at 14. 
321 See generally id. 
322 Id. at 14. 
323 See Alejandro Cancino, Ford Employees “Disciplined, Discharged” After Harassment 
Complaints, CHI. TRIB., May 7, 2015, http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-ford-
plant-manager-0508-biz-20150507-story.html [https://perma.cc/724S-JCGM]. 
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ing several of the employees who had allegedly been a part of the 
harassment.324 Although Ford did not disclose the amount of em-
ployees who had been part of the harassment, it stated that the 
plant manager had been moved to Canada.325 As the woman had 
apparently filed complaints in the past, and nothing had been done 
to curb the behavior, this would fall within the company’s hand-
book under the “Anti-Harassment” section.326 Under that section, 
turning a blind eye to an employee’s harassment complaint would 
constitute a violation.327 
In terms of outside the workplace behavior, such as committing 
a crime, the CBA and company handbook do not provide explicit 
information. It seems that an employee’s supervisor has the discre-
tion to determine if an employee’s out-of-work behavior would fall 
within the “for cause” standard that is located in the CBA. 
By not providing further clarity regarding what constitutes 
“cause” for discipline, the CBA is fairly ambiguous. If employees 
behave in some manner for a period of time and no disciplinary ac-
tion is taken, then it would be difficult to punish an employee in the 
future for behaving the same way—even if the behavior is undesir-
able. The punished employee would point to the lack of discipline 
issued in the past for that same behavior, providing a rather strong 
argument against the presence of “cause.”328 This is likely a cus-
tomary practice, because trying to enumerate a complete list of ex-
amples of “cause” may not be feasible. Employee behavior is un-
predictable, and trying to enumerate every possible example of 
something that would justify “cause” is not practical. Where an 
employee challenges discipline after an initial determination of 
“cause,” employees can take advantage of a formal grievance pro-
cedure.329 
                                                                                                                            
324 See id. 
325 See id. 
326 See Ford Code, supra note 316, at 12. 
327 See id. 
328 See generally Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 138 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1943) (holding 
that the discharge of an employee for his behavior did not constitute “cause” where the 
employee had never been reprimanded for the same conduct in the past). 
329 See UAW CBA, supra note 311, at art. VIII. 
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Ultimately, the initial discipline structure in the UAW–Ford 
relationship is similar to the NFL’s in multiple ways. To start, both 
have a requirement before punishment is warranted; the UAW on-
ly permits punishment “for cause” and the NFL only permits pu-
nishment for “conduct detrimental” to the League.330 Although 
both standards are broad, the NFL and Ford both provide further 
elaboration as to what would fall under each respective standard. 
At Ford, the company provides the employee guidebook, which 
sets out specific conduct that may be punished.331 The NFL has a 
Personal Conduct Policy that, although separate from the CBA 
(much like Ford’s employee conduct guide), further elaborates cer-
tain forms of conduct that would justify punishment.332 
Ford employees may challenge disciplinary action taken against 
them pursuant to section 2’s “Disciplinary Cases” under Article 
VIII.333 After being disciplined, a notice of the discipline is sent to 
an employee’s “Unit Committeeperson.”334 The Unit Committee 
consists of three to four people, and they represent an employee 
during a first stage grievance hearing.335 A first stage grievance 
hearing is essentially an informal meeting between the employee 
and the employer to settle the grievance, if possible.336 In a discipli-
nary grievance action though, a hearing prior to the discipline tak-
ing effect is held, where the employee and his Unit Committee rep-
resentative are typically present.337 In challenging an imposed dis-
cipline following the hearing, the employee’s grievance proceeds to 
Stage Two of the grievance procedure.338 
At Stage Two, a formal written account of the disciplinary ac-
tion is presented to the company’s representative prior to a weekly 
held grievance meeting.339 The company representative will inform 
the Unit Committee chairperson the decision of any of the griev-
                                                                                                                            
330 See id. at art. V § 2; 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 1. 
331 See generally Ford Code, supra note 316. 
332 See 2014 PCP, supra note 21. 
333 See UAW CBA, supra note 311, at art. V § 2. 
334 See id. at art. VIII § 2. 
335 See id. at art. VII. 
336 See id. at art. VIII § 2(a). 
337 See id. at art. VIII § 6(d). 
338 See id. 
339 See id. at art. VIII § 3. 
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ances that were brought before him after no later than one week.340 
If the decision of the company’s representative does not satisfy ei-
ther the Unit Committee or the employee, either may pursue fur-
ther action at the Third Stage.341 
At the Third Stage, the Unit Committee Chairperson writes a 
formal, and detailed, account and appeal to the Plant Review 
Board.342 The Plant Review Board for a multi-unit plant consists of 
at least two members on behalf of the Unit and at least two mem-
bers on behalf of the company.343 The Plant Review Board, ulti-
mately renders a decision on behalf of the company, even though 
the Unit does have a voice in the matter.344 
In the final stage, the grievance is appealed to an impartial 
“Umpire,” who is agreed upon by both sides.345 In order to have a 
grievance appear before the Umpire, the National Ford Depart-
ment of the International Union has to appeal the third stage deci-
sion.346 The Umpire may not hear every appeal that is set before 
him though, such as matters within company discretion.347 Ulti-
mately, when the Umpire does hear and rule on a grievance, the 
decision is final and binding,348 and the union is required to not en-
courage or accompany a member in pursuing an appeal of the Um-
pire’s ruling to court.349 
The grievance procedure set forth in the CBA between UAW 
and Ford seems to provide a more detailed avenue for a grievance 
to be processed than the NFL’s. For example, there are more steps 
that an employee can go through before having to resort to bringing 
suit in court, where the determinations of the arbitrator, or possibly 
Commissioner in the NFL’s case, are almost always upheld.350 
Moreover, in the NFL’s CBA and Personal Conduct Policy, the 
                                                                                                                            
340 See id. 
341 See id. at art. VIII § 4. 
342 See id. 
343 See id. at art. VIII § 5. 
344 See id. 
345 See id. at art. VIII § 7(d). 
346 See id. at art. VIII § 7. 
347 See id. at art. VIII § 12(b)(4). 
348 See id. at art. VIII § 13. 
349 See id. 
350 See supra note 123. 
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appeal goes directly before hearing officers appointed by the Com-
missioner, or before the Commissioner himself.351 In the UAW–
Ford relationship, there is no foreseeable scenario in which the 
person responsible for imposing discipline on the employee may 
also handle the appeal.352 The UAW-Ford’s more comprehensive 
grievance process seems to be a more equitable remedy than the 
NFL’s. 
4. New York City Police Department 
Aside from the auto industry, the service industry provides 
another opportunity to compare the NFL Commissioner’s discip-
linary, and appeal power. This section will discuss the discretio-
nary power that the Commissioner of the New York City Police 
Department (“NYPD”) has to not only discipline police officers 
for their on-site and off-site behavior, but also the role that the Po-
lice Commissioner has in disciplinary appeals. 
Unlike the previously discussed disciplinary proceedings, the 
Police Commissioner’s disciplinary authority lies within New 
York’s State Code, as opposed to a collectively bargained agree-
ment, as decided by the New York’s Court of Appeals in the 1999 
case, Montella v. Bratton.353 The court in Montella ruled: 
“[P]rovisions in the Charter and Code make clear that the Legisla-
ture determined to ‘leave the disciplining of police officers, includ-
ing the right to determine guilt or innocence . . . to the discretion of 
the Police Commissioner, subject, of course, to review by the 
courts pursuant to CPLR article 78.’”354 
The ruling in Montella was reaffirmed in the 2006 case, Patrol-
men’s Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc. v. New 
York State Public Employment Relations Board.355 There, the Patrol 
Benevolent Association, the police officer representative, was chal-
                                                                                                                            
351 See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 2. 
352 Compare UAW CBA, supra note 311, at art. VIII, with 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, 
at art. 46. 
353 See Montella v. Bratton, 93 N.Y.2d 424, 430 (1999) (holding that police officer 
discipline is authorized exclusively to the police Commissioner, pursuant to New York 
City’s Administrative Code). 
354 Id. at 430.  
355 Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of City of N.Y. v. N.Y. State Pub. Emp’t Relations 
Bd. (PBA), 6 N.Y.3d 563, 577 (2006). 
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lenging the Public Employment Relations Board’s determination 
that the changing of certain discipline procedures was not some-
thing that needed to be bargained over.356 The court had to juggle 
“Taylor Law,”357 which requires a public employer to negotiate a 
change in “terms and conditions of employment,”358 with New 
York City’s Administrative Code granting disciplinary decisions 
exclusively to the Police Commissioner.359 The court ultimately 
ruled in favor of New York City’s Charter and Code, rather than 
Taylor Law, and held that the disciplinary changes were within the 
Police Commissioner’s discretion and did not need to be bargained 
over.360 
The authority for the police Commissioner in disciplinary deci-
sions lies within the New York Administrative Code.361 Section 14-
115 of the Administrative Code authorizes the Police Commission-
er: 
[I]n his or her discretion, on conviction by the 
commissioner, or by any court or officer of compe-
tent jurisdiction, of a member of the force of any 
criminal offense, or neglect of duty, violation of 
rules, or neglect or disobedience of orders, or ab-
sence without leave, or any conduct injurious to the 
public peace or welfare, or immoral conduct or con-
duct unbecoming an officer, or any breach of discip-
line, to punish the offending party by reprimand, 
forfeiting and withholding pay for a specified time, 
suspension, without pay during such suspension, or 
by dismissal from the force . . . .362 
                                                                                                                            
356 See id. at 570. 
357 The Public Employees Fair Employment Act, more commonly known as Taylor 
Law, is a New York State Statute, requiring, among other things, a public employer to 
negotiate over any changes made to terms and conditions of employment. See N.Y. CIV. 
SERVICE LAW § 209-a(1)(d) (2012). 
358 See N.Y. CIV. SERVICE LAW § 204(2). 
359 See PBA, 6 N.Y.3d at 572–74; NEW YORK, N.Y., CHARTER § 434(a); NEW YORK, 
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-115(a) (2015). 
360 See PBA, 6 N.Y.3d at 576–77. 
361 See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-115. 
362 Id. 
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Although the investigations that give rise to discipline can oc-
cur internally, they may also be recommended by the Civilian 
Complaint Review Board (“CCRB”).363 The CCRB is essentially a 
forum where civilians can submit complaints of potential miscon-
duct committed by a police officer.364 Although the complaints are 
generally related to behavior of the officers while on-duty, there 
may also be complaints submitted related to the off-duty behavior 
of police officers.365 When the CCRB receives a civilian complaint 
for an officer’s off-duty behavior, it forwards that complaint along 
to the Internal Affairs Bureau (“IAB”), which handles off-duty po-
lice officer misconduct.366 After a hearing and investigation is ei-
ther initiated by the IAB, or follows a CCRB forwarded complaint, 
the Police Commissioner is authorized to take action.367 
Section 14-115 grants the Police Commissioner the authority to 
discipline officers not only for being convicted of a crime, but for 
“immoral conduct or conduct unbecoming an officer.”368 This lan-
guage gives a very broad amount of discretion to the Police Com-
missioner in handling disciplinary matters involving officers in his 
or her department. Whether conduct is “immoral” or “unbecom-
ing” is a subjective determination. For example, recently a New 
York City Police Officer was disciplined after cursing at and berat-
ing an Uber driver.369 In a separate situation, seventeen New York 
                                                                                                                            
363 See APU and Police Discipline, NYC Civilian Complaint Review Board, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/html/police/police.shtml [https://perma.cc/A38M-
5E45] (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). 
364 See id. 
365 See Frequently Asked Questions, NYC Civilian Complaint Review Board, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/html/faq/faq.shtml#a1 [https://perma.cc/R2TS-JZY9] 
(last visited June 2, 2016); Alan Yuhas, NYPD Officer Disciplined After Foul-Mouthed Rant 
at Uber Driver, GUARDIAN (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/apr/01/nypd-officer-investigation-rant-uber-driver 
[https://perma.cc/GR8Q-Z8QS]. 
366 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 365. 
367 See Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of City of New York. v. New York State Pub. 
Emp’t Relations Bd., 6 N.Y.3d 563, 572–74; NEW YORK, N.Y., CHARTER § 434(a); NEW 
YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-115(a). 
368 NEW YORK, N.Y., CHARTER § 434(a). 
369 See Caroline Bankoff, Newly Badgeless NYPD Detective Says He’s Sorry for Freaking 
Out at Uber Driver, NEW YORK MAG. (Apr. 4, 2015), http://nymag.com/daily/
intelligencer/2015/04/nypd-detective-sorry-for-uber-driver-rant.html 
[https://perma.cc/C5F9-VW8Y]. 
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City Police Officers were disciplined after making racist posts on 
Facebook about the West Indian Day Parade.370 These examples 
illustrate that even in situations where police officers are not neces-
sarily violating laws, officers may still be disciplined for their con-
duct while both on-duty and off-duty. 
Even with this broad range of discretion there is a limiting sec-
tion, as officers still are disciplined: 
[O]nly on written charges made or preferred against 
them, after such charges have been examined, heard 
and investigated by the commissioner or one of his 
or her deputies upon such reasonable notice to the 
member or members charged, and in such manner 
or procedure, practice, examination and investiga-
tion as such commissioner may, by rules and regula-
tions, from time to time prescribe.371 
This caveat provides a sort of procedural due process right to 
the officers before punishment may be made against them. It acts 
as a safeguard, preventing punishment imposed by the Police 
Commissioner before the officer has an opportunity to defend 
themselves.372 This internal limiting function is something that the 
NFL doesn’t provide until the grievance stage.373 This due process 
right is important because the opportunity for an officer to defend 
him or herself is provided prior to any sort of drag-out grievance 
process taking place, providing the officer an additional due 
process right and helping to maintain a calm and amicable working 
environment. In the NFL, the Commissioner only needs to follow 
the written notice requirement.374 There is no formal hearing that 
must take place before imposing discipline on a player.375 
                                                                                                                            
370 See Joe Kemp, NYPD Disciplines 17 Cops Who Posted Racist Facebook Comments About 
West Indian Day Parade, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.nydaily
news.com/new-york/nypd-disciplines-17-cops-posted-racist-facebook-comments-west-
indian-day-parade-article-1.1142642 [https://perma.cc/QE75-W4CN]. 
371 NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-115(b). 
372 See id. 
373 Compare id., with 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 1(a). 
374 See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 1(a). 
375 See id. 
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Additionally, the Police Commissioner has the authority to 
suspend officers while a trial involving the officer is pending under 
Section 14-123.376 If the officer is found innocent of the charges, 
however, he is due back pay from the date the suspension began.377 
Lastly, the Police Commissioner may place an officer on probation 
after a conviction, though probation may not last more than a 
year.378 During the probationary period, however, the Police 
Commissioner may impose further punishment on the officer.379 
The Police Commissioner’s disciplinary power over New York 
City police officers is identical to the NFL Commissioner’s discip-
linary power over players. Although there is no definitive phrase 
such as “best interests,” “conduct detrimental,” or “for cause,” 
the city’s Administrative Code does provide an enumerated list of 
possible grounds for discipline.380 Among that list is the “conduct 
unbecoming of an officer” provision, which may be read similarly 
to the previously discussed clauses granted to commissioners or 
managers.381 Additionally, the power to discipline lies exclusively 
with the New York City Police Commissioner, and he may delegate 
that responsibility, similarly to the NFL Commissioner.382 In sum, 
the New York City Police Commissioner’s disciplinary power is 
more than comparable to the NFL Commissioner’s disciplinary 
power, as they are quite similar. 
Another interesting aspect of the disciplinary procedure insti-
tuted by both the NFL and the NYPD is that in the NFL’s new 
Personal Conduct Policy, the NFL Commissioner is authorized to 
suspend a player while an investigation is ongoing.383 In fact, 
Commissioner Goodell was explicit about consulting with the 
                                                                                                                            
376 See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-123. 
377 See id. 
378 See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-115(d). 
379 See id. 
380 See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-115. 
381 See id. 
382 See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-115(b). 
383 See 2014 PCP, supra note 21, at 5. “In cases in which a violation relating to a crime of 
violence is suspected but further investigation is required, the Commissioner may 
determine to place a player or other employee on leave with pay on a limited and 
temporary basis to permit the league to conduct an investigation.” Id. This is known as 
the “Commissioner Exempt List.” Id. 
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NYPD in adding this power in the 2014 Policy.384 It is likely based 
off of the Police Commissioner’s power under section 14-123 to 
suspend an officer while any investigation of a legal matter is ongo-
ing.385 
A formal grievance procedure can be found in New York City’s 
Administrative Code, under section 14-125386 the grievance proce-
dure looks similar to the policy in place in the NFL.387 Under sec-
tion 14-125, the officer wishing to file a grievance over a dismissal 
or demotion must do so in a written application to the mayor of 
New York City.388 From there, the mayor determines whether or 
not a rehearing before the Police Commissioner will take place, 
based on the facts and reasons proffered in support of a rehear-
ing.389 At the rehearing, if the Police Commissioner determines 
that the demotion or termination was done incorrectly, then he 
may reinstate or reposition the grieving officer to the position held 
prior, “and allow him or her the whole of his or her time since such 
dismissal, to be applied on his or her time of service in the depart-
ment . . . .”390 The Police Commissioner may also fashion an addi-
tional, or separate, remedy if he determines that such a remedy is 
just.391 The Police Commissioner, however, may affirm the dismis-
sal or demotion based on the evidence.392 
Lastly, an officer who was dismissed or demoted without a 
formal hearing may issue a written grievance to the mayor request-
ing such an opportunity to be heard.393 From there, the mayor may 
or may not authorize such a proceeding, in which the Police Com-
                                                                                                                            
384 See Ginger Adams Otis, Roger Goodell Prepares NFL’s Tougher Personal Conduct 
Policy, Modeled on NYPD Practices, in Wake of Ray Rice Incident, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 
10, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/roger-goodell-prepares-nfl-
nypd-style-conduct-rules-article-1.2040149 [https://perma.cc/ULS4-T65C]. 
385 Compare NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-123, with 2014 PCP, supra note 21, at 
5. 
386 See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-125. 
387 Compare NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-125, with 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 
10, at art. 46 § 2. 
388 See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-125(a). 
389 See id. 
390 NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-125(c). 
391 See id. 
392 See id. 
393 See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-125(e). 
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missioner is to hold a formal hearing over the matter in which the 
officer was disciplined.394 After the hearing takes place, the Police 
Commissioner may reinstate the officer or place him back in his 
position prior to the demotion, or he may affirm the discipline.395 
As stated above, this grievance procedure is similar to the NFL 
Commissioner’s power at the grievance stage.396 In both instances, 
not only is the Commissioner issuing the initial punishment, but he 
is also the one rendering a decision on appeal.397 This should not 
come as a major surprise though, as Commissioner Goodell has 
previously approved of the manner in which the NYPD handles 
officer discipline.398 Although the NFL’s stated focus of consulting 
with the NYPD was merely to learn how they handle discipline 
during an ongoing investigation, they apparently took a similar ap-
proach to the grievance process regarding employee discipline. In 
the NFL’s new Personal Conduct Policy, a grievance is handed 
under the terms of Article XLVI of the CBA.399 Article XLVI, as 
discussed before, grants the NFL Commissioner the discretionary 
power to act as the body that has the discretion to hear a grievance 
filed by a player.400 
II. CONFLICT 
The main issue that the NFL is currently facing stems not from 
the Commissioner’s power to discipline players at the outset, but 
in the determination of the severity of the punishment and the 
Players’ rights to appeal that punishment. Ultimately, the due 
process rights afforded to NFL players in player discipline are not 
on par with those of other professional athletes or employees in 
other industries.401 
                                                                                                                            
394 See id. 
395 See id. 
396 Compare NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-125, with 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 
10, at art. 46 § 2. 
397 See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 14-125; 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 
46 § 2. 
398 See Report: New NFL Conduct Policy to Borrow from NYPD Playbook, CBS NEWS (Dec. 
10, 2014, 10:52 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/report-new-nfl-conduct-policy-to-
borrow-from-nypd-playbook/ [https://perma.cc/462R-W2C7]. 
399 See 2014 PCP, supra note 21, at 7. 
400 See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46 § 2(a). 
401 Compare supra Section I.C, with supra Section I.D. 
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In terms of the initial punishment, there is no dispute over 
whether the Commissioner should have the basic power to impose 
discipline on players. As discussed, such a power is a fundamental 
part of not only sports, but in other employment settings as well.402 
What is an issue, however, is the Commissioner’s power to subjec-
tively determine punishment as he sees fit, based on the conduct of 
the player.403 In the other examples provided, the initial discipli-
nary power does rest with the commissioner, or supervisor, also, 
but is different when looking at the entirety of the disciplinary 
process.404 
In the other contexts, the players or employees disciplined are 
provided an opportunity to be heard before discipline is im-
posed.405 In the NFL, such an opportunity to be heard is not pro-
vided to the players.406 The only due process right explicitly re-
quired is notice of the pending punishment,407 and not being pu-
nished for the same incident twice. Because the NFL is a private 
labor context though, there is no requirement at all for players to be 
provided certain due process rights.408 
In the other contexts, aside from the New York Police Depart-
ment, the commissioners or supervisors ordinarily do not have the 
power to appoint themselves as the hearing officer for the player 
challenging his or her punishment.409 This prevents the respective 
commissioners, or supervisors, from having complete authority 
over a disciplinary decision. Additionally, although the New York 
City Police Commissioner does have the power to appoint himself 
as the hearing officer, there is an additional right provided to the 
disciplined police officer, granting him or her the right for the op-
portunity to be heard before punishment is issued.410 Although the 
NFL Commissioner may grant such an opportunity to a player be-
fore issuing punishment, that opportunity is not a defined right, as 
                                                                                                                            
402 See supra Sections I.B–D. 
403 See supra Section I.C. 
404 See supra Section I.D. 
405 See supra Section I.D. 
406 See supra Section I.C.1. 
407 See supra Section I.C.1. 
408 See supra Section I.A.2. 
409 See supra Sections I.D.1–3. 
410 See supra Section I.D.4. 
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it is with the NYPD, or even in the MLB or NBA.411 The opportu-
nity to be heard before punishment is issued is a crucial due 
process right, where an NFL player would be able to possibly miti-
gate their discipline through an explanation of the situation. And 
though the NFL player may have the chance to be heard during an 
appeal of their discipline, the NFL Commissioner may ultimately 
appoint themselves as hearing officer and uphold his or her own 
disciplinary determination.412 
Where this situation gets even trickier is in the fact that courts 
typically defer to the decision made by an arbitrator. Although 
NFL players may be able to challenge the impartiality of the arbi-
trator, such a challenge is difficult to prove, and ultimately, courts 
are reluctant to overturn the decisions made by arbitrators.413 
Thus, even in an instance where the NFL Commissioner may give 
the appearance of impartiality, it would still require a strong show-
ing by a player challenging the Commissioner’s impartiality in or-
der for the court to overturn the Commissioner’s decision.414 
In tying this all together, the NFL is currently faced with a two-
fold problem: first, in determining what rights players should have 
during the initial punishment process, and during their appeal 
process; and second, in determining who should decide the initial 
punishment, how the severity should be determined, and who 
should hear a player’s appeal of the punishment. Balancing the due 
process rights of the players with the League’s desire to protect 
itself from “conduct detrimental” is an issue that can only be recti-
fied by examining due process rights provided to employees in oth-
er labor contexts. 
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
It is likely that we will see some sort of change in the NFL 
Commissioner’s role in the disciplinary process. From March 20 to 
March 23, 2016, NFL Management and the NFL Players’ Associa-
tion met in Boca Raton, Florida, for their annual meeting to discuss 
                                                                                                                            
411 Compare supra Section I.C, with supra Section I.D. 
412 See supra Section I.C. 
413 See supra Section I.C. 
414 See supra Section I.C. 
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various issues concerning the League.415 Player discipline, and a 
potential change in the Commissioner’s involvement in it, was 
touched upon during the meeting.416 Although there were discus-
sions about future change initially, the talks broke down and no 
agreement was reached.417 It is still unknown as to whether there 
will be a change to the Commissioner’s role in player discipline 
moving forward.418 Nevertheless, it is worth exploring what a poss-
ible change could look like, and what it should look like, in the fu-
ture. 
In fashioning a solution as to how the NFL Commissioner’s 
disciplinary power can better account for additional due process 
rights for the players, it is important to look at the previously men-
tioned power structures, as well as the ideas proposed by internal 
members of the NFL.419 Furthermore, it is also important to not 
only look at the initial punishment power, but also at the power of 
the Commissioner in the appeal process. Because the appeal 
process acts as a limiting function to the authority to impose an ini-
tial punishment, both stages impact one another and need to be 
considered in determining a proper power structure. 
Although the examples of disciplinary structures discussed 
provide a small sample size, it seems that a common theme exists, 
particularly at the initial punishment stage. At the initial punish-
ment stage, both the sports’ commissioners and the employers (or 
                                                                                                                            
415 Key NFL Offseason Dates for 2016, NFL.COM: AROUND THE NFL (Feb. 13, 2016), 
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000636092/article/key-nfl-offseason-dates-
for-2016 [https://perma.cc/333L-RDZQ]. 
416 Ron Clements, NFL, NFLPA Moving Toward Deal to Strip Roger Goodell of Discipline 
Authority, SPORTING NEWS (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.sportingnews.com/nfl-
news/4698431-nfl-nflpa-near-deal-to-end-roger-goodell-discipline-authority 
[https://perma.cc/UP5A-LWW9]. 
417 Jim Trotter, Talks over Roger Goodell’s Disciplinary Role Take “Massive Step 
Backwards,” ESPN (Mar. 24, 2016), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/15053643/talks-
nfl-nflpa-reduction-roger-goodell-role-break-down [https://perma.cc/7R5R-4PS6] 
418 Mark Maske, Little Optimism Remains over Possible Reforms to Roger Goodell’s 
Disciplinary Role, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
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goodells-disciplinary-role/ [https://perma.cc/LEB2-8SYN]. 
419 See Ken Belson, Roger Goodell Open to Changing Role in N.F.L. Disciplinary Process, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/09/sports/football/
roger-goodell-open-to-changing-role-in-nfl-disciplinary-process.html 
[https://perma.cc/A4DG-ABYQ]; see generally supra Parts I–II. 
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commissioners) in other industries enjoy a broad range of discre-
tionary power when imposing initial discipline on an employee or 
player.420 A possible explanation for the broad range of discretio-
nary power afforded to commissioners during the disciplinary 
process is the idea that companies and organizations want to be 
able to police their own members.421 In enabling the supervisors, 
managers, and commissioners to handle initial employee discipline, 
this goal is met. 
At the first stage of my proposed solution, I believe that the 
NFL Commissioner should still be the one to impose initial discip-
line. The “best interests” clause, and the “conduct detrimental” 
language that functions as an extension of it, is an integral part of 
not only the history of commissioner power, but of sports history in 
general.422 As a matter of fact, such discretionary power at the ini-
tial discipline stage is consistent with all four examples discussed 
above.423 
Starting with MLB in 1921, Commissioner Landis demanded to 
have the power to take action on behalf of the “best interests” of 
baseball.424 This broad range of power, which encompasses the 
power to discipline players, has been included in the various 
CBAs.425 In the NBA, the same power and language is granted to 
the Commissioner under the framework of the NBA’s Constitu-
tion.426 The Commissioner’s broad power to discipline players has 
been supported, albeit reduced, in cases such as the Latrell Spre-
well incident and the “Malice at the Palace.”427 In the New York 
City Police Department, the Police Commissioner has the same 
exclusive power to discipline police officers under the City’s Ad-
ministrative Code and Charter.428 Although the Code lists exam-
ples of behavior that will be disciplined, the section does give the 
                                                                                                                            
420 See supra Sections I.C–D.4. 
421 Susan L. Merrill, Internal Investigations, SG091 ALI-ABA 91, 114 (2002) (providing a 
rationale for handling discipline internally). 
422 See supra Sections I.C–D.2. 
423 See generally supra Part II. 
424 See supra Section I.B. 
425 See supra Section I.B. 
426 See supra Section I.D.2. 
427 See supra Section I.D.2. 
428 See supra Section I.D.4. 
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broad phrase “conduct unbecoming of a police officer” which 
grants the Police Commissioner the power to discipline officers for 
similar conduct that is proscribed by MLB, NBA, and NFL.429 
Lastly, in the UAW–Ford relationship, Ford has the power to dis-
cipline employees “for cause.”430 Although some examples are 
provided in the company guidelines, “for cause” is broad, and is 
worded so that management cannot discipline an employee arbitra-
rily.431 The “for cause” standard requires that the employee en-
gage in some form of conduct that would warrant discipline, similar 
to the “conduct detrimental [to the NFL]” provision. 
Additionally, the NFL’s “conduct detrimental” standard, and 
the Commissioner’s disciplinary power, have been supported when 
independent hearing officers have reviewed it. The power has been 
upheld in court,432 it is language that the player unions have agreed 
to in bargaining through all three major sports,433 and that power 
should continue to be a part of the NFL Commissioner’s job. 
A change that I do recommend at the initial stage is the inclu-
sion of the right to a hearing before the commissioner imposes dis-
cipline, as modeled from the NYPD’s handling of misconduct by 
an officer.434 As of now, the Commissioner in the NFL must simply 
meet a notice requirement in informing the player and NFLPA of 
the discipline within the time specified.435 
I would, however, retain the Commissioner’s Exempt List in 
place under the current Personal Conduct Policy. The concept of 
providing an opportunity to be heard before a final punishment, 
while simultaneously placing the player on leave with pay during 
the investigation, are not mutually exclusive ideas. As seen in the 
Rice, Hardy, and Peterson situations, it is possible to temporarily 
suspend players with pay while ultimately providing them with an 
                                                                                                                            
429 See supra Section I.D.4. 
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opportunity to be heard prior to imposing the final punishment.436 
Ultimately, under my proposal, the Commissioner would need to 
provide the player with an opportunity to be heard before issuing 
punishment, while also placing the player on paid leave via the 
Commissioner’s Exempt List, which would add a step to the initial 
punishment stage. 
A possible alternative to the Commissioner being the sole per-
son empowered with discretionary power in imposing punishments 
would be to designate a person, mutually agreed upon by the play-
ers and the League, to decide punishment issues. Although the 
CBA’s language does provide for something similar to that in Ar-
ticle XLVI, by granting the Commissioner the authority to dele-
gate, there is not a requirement in granting exclusive power to such 
a designated person.437 Out of the examples discussed above, the 
closest thing to having such a person comes from the NFL itself, 
with the “disciplinary officer” in the Personal Conduct Policy. As 
discussed above though, the Commissioner does not need to dele-
gate the discipline decision to the officer, and when he does not, 
the officer’s recommendation is exactly that: a recommendation. 
Having such a designated person is not a foreign concept, as this is 
something that Commissioner Goodell has actually mentioned 
himself.438 
Ultimately, at the initial punishment stage, it seems best to 
keep the NFL Commissioner’s power to govern in the best inter-
ests of the League intact. The Commissioner represents, at least in 
theory, an unbiased party looking out for the League as a whole, 
not any one particular team. Additionally, by enabling the Commis-
sioner to handle the disciplinary decisions, player conduct is po-
liced from within, by an individual who has experience in discipli-
nary matters. Although an agreed-upon third party with the exclu-
sive power to impose initial discipline could be possible, such an 
arrangement has never been done before in any of the industries 
                                                                                                                            
436 This allows the League to complete a thorough investigation prior to issuing 
punishment so one does not end up with a situation similar to that of Rice where the 
suspension is increased after new evidence comes to light. 
437 See generally 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 10, at art. 46. 
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discussed above.439 Nevertheless, Commissioner Goodell has ad-
mitted recently that he would be open to vesting the initial discip-
line power in such a way.440 
Although the initial punishment policy under my solution 
would remain relatively the same, the appeal procedure would not. 
Granting the Commissioner the power to not only impose the ini-
tial punishment, but then to appoint himself as the person to hear 
the appeal, does not seem to encourage impartiality in the appeal 
process.441 Because he will already have ruled on the punishment, 
he is likely to be pre-disposed to a particular judgment on the ap-
peal. Enabling a new person—or people, in a panel of hearing offic-
ers—to oversee the appeal will provide for a second party, who was 
not involved in the initial decision, and thus will likely be less influ-
enced by the prior punishment when making a final determination. 
A panel of hearing officers would be comprised of three mem-
bers: one selected by the NFLPA, one selected by the League, and 
a third arbitrator jointly selected by the parties, in a manner that is 
similar to the MLB and NBA.442 A list provided by a major arbitra-
tion agency, such as the American Arbitration Association, would 
be given to both parties, and each party would cross off arbitrators 
on the list, one-by-one, until a final arbitrator remained; if they 
could not agree on that final arbitrator, then the two selected arbi-
trators would be the ones to agree on the third. The panel would 
hear all appeals regardless of the source of the disciplinary power. 
In the MLB, each side selects one of the three arbitrators, and the 
parties agree on the third. In the NBA, only one arbitrator, who is 
also mutually-agreed upon, handles the appeals.443 
The arbitration panel would serve for the duration of one sea-
son, though all three members may be reelected at the start of the 
next season. In both the NBA and MLB though, either party can 
fire the mutually agreed upon arbitrator during a set period of 
time.444 This presents both sides with the opportunity to prevent 
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an unfair arbitrator constantly upholding disciplinary decisions, or 
constantly overturning decisions. The NBA incorporates a slightly 
different approach than the MLB, because the NBA Commissioner 
retains the power to hear appeals for minor disciplinary deci-
sions.445 Such a situation could be possible moving forward in the 
NFL, if the players were to agree to it. 
By having a panel of three hearing officers, with a designated, 
and mutually agreed upon, impartial third officer, the player filing 
the grievance would be provided a more unbiased hearing. Though 
members of both the NFLPA and the Owners have considered 
changing the Commissioner’s power at the initial stage, they have 
not looked to do so at the appeal stage.446 The Commissioner him-
self, as discussed before, has admitted to being open to such a re-
duction of his initial punishment power, but was dismissive of re-
linquishing his appeal power to a neutral arbitrator.447 Despite this, 
the League will continue to face pressure to change the appeal 
process as other sports have implemented a neutral arbitrator to 
handle disciplinary appeals. 
By allowing each side to appoint their own arbitrator, and then 
agreeing upon the third, disputes can be handled by people who are 
inside the business. In such a scenario, the people who are making 
the appeal decisions are close enough to the goings on of the NFL 
to understand the ramifications of their decisions, how the player’s 
conduct conforms to the League, and how that type of conduct has 
usually been handled. By having an internally experienced panel, 
decisions can be made more efficiently, and the appeal process will 
be run more smoothly. Additionally, rather than having the griev-
ance processed outside the NFL, or having the Commissioner be 
the “judge, jury, and executioner,” the three-member panel pro-
vides an objective body to hear grievances. 
The three-member panel would have the authority to affirm a 
punishment, reduce it, or eliminate it entirely. The ability to im-
pose punishment, as stated above, would belong exclusively to the 
Commissioner, so the panel would not be enabled to increase a 
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player’s discipline. Under my proposal, the decision of the three-
member panel would be final and binding on both parties, though 
either side would have the right to bring a claim in court over a 
procedural error, or if the panel overstepped their authority in de-
ciding a grievance. 
The three-member panel would have the same authority as the 
arbitration panels in the UAW–Ford agreement, the MLB, and the 
NBA. As seen in the Latrell Sprewell incident, the Commissioner 
does have the broad power to discipline a player, but the Grievance 
Arbitrator can reduce punishment down to what is fair and reason-
able given the circumstances. Such a power to be able to cap the 
Commissioner’s disciplinary power, much like with Ford, MLB, 
and NBA, belongs in the NFL. 
CONCLUSION 
With the various avenues that the Commissioner can discipline 
players—Constitution, CBA, Personal Conduct Policy, and 
UPC—it is important to nail down why his power exists under 
each. Under the CBA, Personal Conduct Policy, and UPC, the 
Commissioner would maintain his current broad disciplinary pow-
er. This makes sense because he is unbiased in the sense that his 
loyalty is to the NFL as a whole rather than to an individual fran-
chise, and discipline under the aforementioned sources seeks to 
eliminate potential conduct that would negatively impact the 
League as a whole. 
In order to limit the Commissioner’s power, the grievance pro-
cedure proposal does remove the Commissioner’s power to over-
see appeals on which he rendered an initial punishment. That type 
of authority, aside from the NYPD, is basically unheard of. None of 
the MLB, NBA, or Ford managers are provided such an expansive 
role in the appeal process. By eliminating that power, and imple-
menting a three-member panel to hear player grievances, the policy 
of handling disputes internally is maintained, while an objective 
body, unrelated to the initial punishment, is the deciding body of 
the appeal. 
